To what extent can Realism adequately explain Brexit?
In March 2017, the British government invoked Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon and began the process of leaving the European Union (EU), marking the first formal step of “Brexit.” Britain’s relationship with Europe had been tentative throughout its membership, failing to fully embrace European policy; yet the decision to sever ties with its neighbours was seen as baffling by many. This essay will aim to examine the reasons why Britain chose to leave the EU from a Realist perspective – firstly by looking at the key features of the theory itself, then by using them to analyse the security and economic factors regarding the decision. It will also look at constructivist theory, and the role domestic factors played in the decision to leave.
First, we must look at the relationship between Britain and Europe. After the Second World War, Churchill seen Britain’s role in the world as within ‘three circles:’ the Commonwealth, although diminishing; the transatlantic partnership with the US, and Europe. As the Empire weakened; the focus began to resonate on the other groups – with Britain in some ways acting as the link between them (Wallace, 2005). As British influence also began to dwindle, it became a smaller part of the US fight against Communism. Thus it was to be Europe where Britain’s interests lay, and it applied to the EEC (Sanders and Houghton, 2017, pp135-165). However, de Gaulle’s opinion of Britain was poor. He wanted the EEC to be a security community independent from the US– and the relationship between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan led to de Gaulle vetoing the application. Following de Gaulle’s departure from Élysée Palace, British membership seemed inevitable; and accession was confirmed, along with allies Ireland and Denmark, in 1973. (Ibid.)
Britain was a rogue nation within the EU under Thatcher, and later Major –who remained obstructive to any supranational integration. Indeed, Thatcher believed that economic union would result in German domination of Europe (Wall, 2008, pp87-107). In turn, throughout the rest of the century, Britain would opt out of various EU policies – the most prominent being the Schengen Agreement and the Euro. Then, as the financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent refugee crisis strained both the EU and its members, Prime Minister Cameron announced a referendum on EU membership – seen as an attempt to resolve differences within his own party. (Glencross, 2016). The ‘Leave’ vote in this referendum led to Brexit.
In examining the Brexit decision from a realist perspective, we must first take a look at the theory itself. Realism focuses on four foundational myths: egoism, groupism, anarchy and power politics, which will be discussed in turn.
An egoist approach to politics can be seen through classical Realism. The first of Morgenthau’s ‘principles’ is that the rules which govern politics are embedded into human nature. Those which influence modern nation-states are the same as those which influenced previous societies, and they will do as long as humans exist. (Morgenthau, 2006) This translates to egoist behaviour in a Hobbesian sense; as humans prioritise themselves over others; and no incentive can change that. Niebuhr (1932, p21) claimed that “it will never be possible to insure moral antidotes sufficiently potent to destroy… the poison of power upon character.” He then claims that by creating a nation to rid man of his egoism, it is “simply raised to the nth degree” (Ibid, p107). Thus, states are the most immoral of actors, and are completely self-interested and unilateral, only cooperating if it is beneficial to them.
By creating the nation, it becomes inevitable that politics takes place within and between these groups- with the nation-state the main actor. To exist above survival, solidarity is needed in the way of nationalism (Wohlforth, 2008, p133). Yet this nationalism is what generates conflict, as different states prioritise differently, and aim to exert their power on the rest of the world.
The third foundational myth of Realism is the presence of anarchy in the international system. There is no authority at international level to control states, as the state does to its citizens. Realism denies the existence of an international society similar to civil society at a state level, as there is a lack of interdependence, moral, or cultural understanding between states. (McCarthy, 1993).
When combined, these factors create power politics. States are concerned only for their own survival and security; and maximising their power is their best outcome. Thus, they become rational actors, due to similar interests, whose sole interests are self-preservation, such as in Hobbes’ state of nature. Hence, they are only interested in relative gains – they always want to gain more than their competitors, regardless of joint gains in a mutually beneficial policy. This means that conflict and war are inevitable. Yet despite power being a key concept of Realism, Morgenthau (2006) acknowledges that it does not have a fixed meaning.
These foundations of realism will now be used to analyse Brexit; firstly, in terms of security, and then in terms of economic and social factors.
Rosato (2011a) provides a typical Realist arugment against the EU, claiming that its foundation is bipolarity. States in continental Europe were feared of the USSR, with no supranational ‘Leviathian’ to constrain its power. European states lacked power on their own – they did not have sufficient militaries, and also were struggling economically due to WWII. However, instead of relying on the other hegemon in the US, European states built a balancing ‘bloc;’ which when combined, had enough power to deter Soviet forces from invasion. Thus, Soviet defeat and collapse led to the nullification of the rasion d’être of the EU. Therefore, in a world with one hegemon, the EU has no reason to exist and so Britain is justified in leaving. Britain’s is aa powerful member of NATO– and thus no longer requires the EU to assure its own security (Oliver, 2017). However, whilst a convincing reason for Brexit is the collapse of the EU; presumed subsequent exits from France and the Netherlands have not gained traction, and so this Realist argument cannot explain Brexit.
Another security-related reason for Brexit would be Britain’s relationship with the US. As part of the transition from Empire, Britain became the “bridge” between Europe and the US, and often bandwagons the US for international influence (Posen, 2006). However, with the election of President Trump, there are questions as to whether this can continue – especially due to a lack of trust between governments in the anarchic system. (Drezner, 2015). Thus, Brexit appears a miscalculation; as Britain loses its influence not only in the EU but also as an ally of the US, should the US progress in isolationism. Here, the EU might emerge as a hegemon itself; with Britain an outsider. In both cases, British bandwagoning reveals Realists would not advocate Brexit, as there would be a relative loss in power for the UK due to its inability to bandwagon the unpredictable Trump. Therefore, despite Realism’s scepticism of the EU, it provides Britain with both security and influence.
Since the Cold War, European states have furthered their integration economically; with the introduction of the Euro, and the Schengen Agreement, to establish a single market. Even Waltz (1971/2008) notes that the interdependence between European states, ties them into a cooperative system, to maximise their power collectively. However, Rosato (2011a) disagrees with this, claiming that it was path dependency which caused the Euro, first conceptualised in the 1980s; before the collapse of the USSR. The EU remains economically important today however, as the single market and its wide-ranging sanctions, provide insurance from the “cheating” problem (Donnelly, 2000). It can be thus argued that egoistic states cannot fully capitalise economically inside the EU, especially considering the UK’s trade deficit with it (Oliver, 2017). Britain opted out from the Euro and Schengen, therefore not being a true player in the single market, and accordingly could not compete with the modern German economy. Indeed, the importance of relative gains is paramount, as the UK was gaining much less from the EU than others, and was unable to create trade agreements of its own due to EU rules. This importance is highlighted by Waltz (1971/2008, p29) who states that “hard bargaining within the EEC [sic] indicates that governments do not lose interest in who will gain more and who will gain less,” also showing the fact that despite the change in focus, conflict remains. Rosato (2011b) states that when faced with a competitor of similar power – such as Germany– states will either buck-pass or power balance. As an outsider to the Eurozone, the UK was hit hard by the financial crisis, without the relative safety of large numbers in the Euro, which proteced the Germans somewhat. This means that now, the UK cannot power balance effectively, and that Brexit could be considered an economic buck-pass to the rest of the EU– as Britain aims to boost its economy on an international stage. As a result, it can be said that, when applied to the political economy of the EU, realism can effectively explain Brexit as an economic decision, as Britain aims to maximise its own egoistic interests elsehow.
We have so far seen that in power politics, Realists would see Britain’s power maximising state inside the EU for security, but outside for economics. We will now examine the social factors of the Brexit vote.
Support for the EU in the UK declined every year from Maastricht to Brexit (Curtice and Evans, 2015). Moreover, the rise of the populist UKIP had revealed clear attitudes within Britain against Brussels. Whilst similar support for Euroscepticism existed across Europe, especially in France and Germany, no state ever reached anywhere close to what became Brexit. From a neoclassical Realist perspective, all states are rational, power-maximisers with their capabilities determined by material factors. As France, Germany and the UK are roughly comparable on an economic level, it is clear that realism cannot examine social factors on its own. Thus, we turn to constructivism.
Constructivists may argue that the reason Britain left the EU, yet other European countries would not entertain the debate, is that Euroscepticism became part of the establishment in the UK, inside the Conservative party. Hobolt (2016) explains that factions within the governing Conservatives pushed Europe onto the agenda, and into the mainstream of politics, instead of Brexit simply being a far-right ideal. In both Germany and France, however, governing parties have always been pro-Europe, and thus the debate is never truly on the political agenda (ibid). Andreatta (2011), argues that the reason for this is because both Axis powers and invaded territories witnessed the self-destructing effects of European conflict and realised that cooperation was necessary to prevent it happening again. In comparison, Britain was never invaded and so was never truly ‘European.’ Constructivist theory not only helps explain the strong resistance to the EU in England and Wales, as the establishment theory reveals why Scotland and Northern Ireland both voted to stay in the EU; as both governing and opposition parties in their very different political systems backed a remain vote (McEwen, 2016). Overall, when looking through a constructivist lens, Brexit was inevitable, as the citizens were never truly part of the EU.
In conclusion, Realism provides a useful tool in examining Brexit. In terms of security and power, it can be seen that Britain may actually be better off inside the EU, especially under Trump’s isolationist presidency. By opting out of the Euro and from Schengen, the UK has struggled to compete since the financial crisis, and thus is aiming to forge a unilateral path to renewed influence; an economic justification for leaving the EU. Constructivism has also proved its worth in explaining Brexit as a matter of identity and internal politics, wherein it is actually unsurprising that the UK voted to Leave, as it was a decision supported by the establishment as well as their opponents. In summation, Brexit can be explained by Realism to a certain extent – but other approaches must be considered in order to analyse it fully.