Start introduction here talk about indigenous. The Han Chinese assault on and cultural exploitation of the identity of the Uyghur people has resulted in a loss of Uyghur traditions, language and religion.
The Uyghur people are one of 55 ethnic minorities (shaoshu minzu) officially recognized by the Chinese government. The group is of Turkic background and traces its heritage back to the Altai Mountains of central Asia, although most of the population now lives in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in western China (See Map 1). Predominantly Sunni Muslims, the Uyghurs comprise 46.8% of the 21.81 million people living in the region, with the other 40.1% being Han Chinese (Shukla 294). Throughout recent times, the Han population (the native Chinese population and often associated with China’s seat of government in Beijing) has been migrating in large amounts to the region (a movement of bodyspaces), putting pressure on Uyghurs and forming an ethnic barrier between the Han and Uyghur groups. A specific social boundary exists between the two populations as “with the exception of practical relationships formed within the work environment, Uyghurs do not willingly mix with Han Chinese,” and “ethnic segregation is maintained between the two groups in the home environment, on the street and in all social situations” (Smith 167).
The Uyghur's religious liberties have been under threat as the Chinese government has enacted policies suppressing religious practices freedom. In China, organized religious activity and public practices are controlled by the Nationality and Religious Affairs Bureau. In the context of the Uyghur, an ethnic minority, their activities are "monitored and regulated in accordance with specific policies aimed at preventing any attempt to trigger social unrest, threaten China's territorial integrity, or disrupt national unity" (Hillman and Tuttle 43). Because of the XUAR's location around many predominantly Muslim countries, the Chinese government is afraid of the Uyghur's assimilation into Islamic extremist groups from these neighboring nations. These "global islamic solidarities," particularly in an age after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, represent a threat in the minds of the Chinese government (Smith Finley 648). In addition, the role of religion in Chinese society is minimal, as many Chinese citizens do not actively practice a core set of beliefs and see religion as only a personal interest. This translates to the careful control and close management of Uyghurs expressing their religion in public in order to "'dilute religious consciousness' in the population" (Bovingdon 68). Since Islam is a key part of Uyghur identity, the Chinese government has prohibited employees in the public sector from wearing Islamic head scarves or coverings, fasting during Ramadan, or attending prayers of religious practices. In addition, Uyghurs may only study the Koran, the holy text of Islam in specific government schools, and "Imams [worship leaders of Mosques] cannot teach the Koran in private" (Hasmath 122). Furthermore, mosques and other key tenets of Islam have been destroyed and their leaders violent persecuted by Chinese authority. This has resulted in widespread riots in the region due to this religious repression and discrimination against Uyghur religion and identity. In a report published by the Uyghur Human Rights Project, a nonprofit dedicated to promoting human rights and democracy while raising awareness for the plight of the Uyghur people, the organization calls for the group’s religious freedom. According to Article 9, “indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous community or nation…no discrimination of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right” (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People and the Uyghurs of East Turkestan 30). The destruction of the Uyghur’s rights and freedoms to religion represents a significant portion of the Chinese government’s degradation of Uyghur culture and dehumanization of the population.
Another aspect of the Chinese government’s exploitation of Uyghur identity lies in restrictive education systems and the lack of instruction of the native language, further contributing to the loss of identity. The recent education developments towards monolingualism are part of the Chinese government’s initiative to “Develop the West” (also known as xibu dakaifa) and fundamentally change the “language of instruction” in Uyghur society (qtd. in Dwyer 37). A key change was in May 2002 in Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi, when the college ended all courses in the native Uyghur language. In 2004, this ordinance was extended to most of the region’s schools. The Chinese reasoning for this change was mostly out of perceived economic reasons: “the government directed schools in Xinjiang to use Mandarin as the language of instruction to improve the ‘quality’ of Uyghurs so that they would be more competitive in the job market” (Zang 2058). With large amounts of Han migration into the Xinjiang region from as early as 1955 (when the autonomous region was established) Han Chinese have expressed an innate refusal to learn the Uyghur language. Populating the cities, where economic opportunities are more abundant, the in-migration has changed the linguistic landscape so that “Mandarin has become the language of upward mobility in Xinjiang as well as the rest of China” (Gladney 240). Dramatically impacting the labor market, these Chinese have created a competition for jobs with their Uyghur counterparts. In order to gain access to higher paying jobs, Mandarin has become a necessity in the education training of the Uyghur people. However, the Uyghurs do not view their language destruction in the same positive light as the Chinese government: “Minorities in Xinjiang—particularly Uyghurs—have perceived the changes to monolingual instruction as a cultural attack; and this perception has fostered the very identity polarization (Uyghur versus Chinese) that Beijing would like to neutralize” (Dwyer 41). This “linguistic genocide,” as one author writes, has had profound impacts on the way Uyghurs view their identity and has caused a rise of Uyghur nationalism and ethnic consciousness (qtd. in Smith Finley 36). In any nation or ethnic group, language is viewed as a key part of a group’s identity and is often associated with power. As the government has imposed regulations against Uyghur language, Uyghurs have tried to maintain their ethnic identity as their language “embodies nearly every dimension of a given culture: ritual and routine activity, conversation, emotion and artistic expression” (Zang 2057-2058).
The low prevalence of Uyghur language in today’s Xinjiang society creates a symbolic boundary between the Uyghur and Han, contributing to the erasure of Uyghur culture and sparking conflict and potentially violence. There is a key division between the two languages in the eyes of the Uyghur people: “Most Uyghurs express their preference for the Uyghur language by making clear distinctions between the home environment and ‘the outside’, corresponding to times when they speak Uyghur and times when they consent to speak Chinese” (Smith 159). Through the the “de facto institutionalisation of the Chinese language”, the Uyghur have been marginalized in their own society and territory (Smith 157). Even though many Uyghurs still speak their native language at home, the lack of its implementation in schools could potentially degrade their culture and quite possibly remove the language completely. Still, many Uyghurs prefer to conduct day-to-day business in the Uyghur script and have used Chinese as a language of practical convenience only (Smith 159). Article 14 of the Uyghur Human Rights Project report declares that “Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning” (United Nations Declaration 24). Through their various actions to reduce the availability of Uyghur language education, the government is denying a fundamental right of communication to the Uyghur people. This has caused periods of unrest and rioting in the region, as well as a rise in ethnic consciousness — “the awareness of membership in an ethnic group by both group members and the larger society in which they reside” (Zang 2047). In a recent survey conducted among 799 Uyghurs in Urumqi in 2007, 72.3 percent completely agreed that it is important to use Uyghur language and 66.2 percent completely agreed that it is important to promote Uyghur culture (Zang 2067). With language being an essential part of culture, an attack on the Uyghur language represents a greater step towards the degradation of Uyghur culture and identity.
Through various actions of the Chinese government, its attack on Uyghur identity has caused a recent onset of Uyghur riots and ethnic conflict both in Xinjiang and around China. Bringing this issue into the wider context of globalization, the repression of Uyghur identity by the Chinese represents a blocking of the Uyghur’s globalization movement. This has caused rise in ethnic consciousness, “uniting Uyghurs and mobilizing them to participate in various forms of collective action against or engagement with the Chinese nation-state” (Dautcher 305). The fate of the Uyghur group remains at stake, as conflict between the Chinese government and the indigenous population has shown very few signs of ceasing in the near future.
Start conclusion here
Conclusion to globalization
Boundaries
Tuttle 53 – linguistic manipulation
Treatment by the media
Add map 1