Anthony Hahn
Dr. Andrea Tschemplik
PHIL 410 – 001
October 23rd, 2017
Philo-virtue
Virtue is a trait that helps us achieve a good life, and the ultimate purpose of human existence is happiness. However, if happiness is the ultimate purpose of human existence, and one gains happiness through the mean, then how does one remain virtuous, and how do emotions impact that strive for happiness, while humans trying to remain virtuous? To figure out how emotions tie into virtue, we will have to explain Aristotle’s account of emotions, which he discusses in “On the Soul”, and briefly in the “Nicomachean Ethics”, and his account of virtuousness, which he talks about at large in the “Nicomachean Ethics.”
Aristotle sets up the account of emotion in his work, “On the Soul,” where he validates the existence, complexities, and physiology, of our emotions. For this, he perfectly sets up the mean, and how we are required to act on it repeatedly, in order to be virtuous. Through reaching virtuousness, we can experience true happiness. Often times, we see people acting on their emotions, giving them a momentary feeling of happiness, or relieve. However, to reach true happiness, an emotion that only few will experience, we need to live in the mean, which might require not always acting to our emotions.
In Aristotle’s work, “On the Soul”, he presents an account of emotions belonging to the rational being. Having an emotional thought process occurs only in the rational soul, which belongs to humans. As sad as it sounds, he also mentions this in the “Nicomachean Ethics”, by saying that “the rest of the animals do not participate in happiness, since they are completely deprived of such an activity” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1178b25), though I’d like to imagine that my dog would beg to differ with that. All things considered, emotions would have to be understood as part of potentiality, as well as actuality, once they become active.
Aristotle does not, however, know whether emotions are shared with the soul or not, or at least thinks that it is difficult to determine. As he mentioned, “it is necessary to take this up, though it is not easy, but it does seem to take up with most of its attributes, the soul neither does anything nor has anything done to it without the body, as with being angry, being confident, desiring, and every sort of sensing” (On the Soul, 403a5). He shares emotions with the ability of sensing in the rational being.
However, he later mentions that when we are in an emotional state, our soul is acting along with the body. This is an amazing thought, considering that psychology was not a vastly discovered field by his time. He mentions that “all the attributes of the soul seem to be with a body – spiritedness, gentleness, fear, pity, boldness, and also joy, as well as loving and hating, for together with these the body undergoes something. This is revealed when strong and obvious experiences do not lead to the soul’s being provoked or frightened, while sometimes it is being provoked by small and obscure ones, when the body is in an excited state and bears itself in the way it does when it is angry” (On the Soul, 403a15). In contradiction to his previous statement, he seems to believe that the soul and emotions are inseparable. It could be said that emotions directly ‘move the soul,’ as we often use as a figure of speech when we say that somebody poured their soul into a piece of art, or anything else or that matter.
This connection between the soul and emotions, and what kind of beings share similar emotions, is highly important, as later, when we discuss virtue. It is obvious that a soul is required to be virtuous, as much as it is required to have a soul to be anything. Furthermore, the question could arise on why, despite human reason, and need for virtuousness, we still have unvirtuous behaviors. One explanation could be human emotions.
The account of emotions in “On the Soul,” could explain why we cannot all reach the mean. Does the account of emotions explain our inability to reach the mean, which makes us non-virtuous? Or, conversely, since emotions are just an in-the-moment feeling, and are not habituated, do they not play into virtuous behavior at all?
In the “Nicomachean Ethics”, Aristotle explains emotions as “desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, affection, hatred, yearning, jealousy, pity, and generally things which are accompanied by pleasure or pain” (Ethics, 1105b21). In this same book, Aristotle discusses virtue, what it means to be a virtuous person, the importance of it, and how to achieve it.
Aristotle believes that it is always required to deliberate, before acting, in order for the act to be virtuous. Furthermore, as Aristotle defined it, to be a virtuous person, one has to repeatedly engage in virtuous behavior, for the right reasons. Because we are not virtuous by nature, although our childhood often directs us to leading a virtuous or non-virtuous life, we all have the potential to be virtuous. And it is these virtues that help lead us to the ultimate good in life, happiness. Those virtues can be achieved by understanding the mean, which is the effort to be between the excessive and the lacking, often called vices. The mean can be achieved by repeated behavior, so virtues must be habituated.
In order to be virtuous, it is required to act on these means, which, as I mentioned, lie between virtues and vices. For example, when one is in danger, that person neither should neither act too careless, nor too cowardly, but instead, the mean, courageous. Similarly, we see euphoria or depression, which both are two extreme feelings on a spectrum. True happiness, as Aristotle describes it, however, seems to be different from all these other emotions. As it is the kind of happiness we are trying to reach, because it is the ultimate purpose of our existence.
The mean then, meaning navigating behaviors between two extremes, provides morality. And since emotions very often motivate our actions, they could be one explanation of why we often deal in extremes, as emotions are accompanied by either pleasure or pain, two opposite extremes, that Aristotle believes accompany all emotions. Just as one cannot know happiness without knowing sadness, sadness and happiness are two extremes, and through the mean, once knowing and acting on both, we can try to reach true happiness. And we have to live a life of mean, in order to be virtuous.
Of course, not all actions permit to having a mean. While one is required to act virtuous most of the time, it does not mean that the virtuous person has to act virtuous every time they are faced with a decision, as that is too much to ask, even of the most virtuous person, because of many factors, one of which being that many mean conditions and emotions already imply badness in themselves, such as “joy at others’ misfortunes, shamelessness, and envy, and in the case of actions, adultery, stealing, and murder” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1107a8). There is not much of a choice one is able to do, since either way, the choice will not be right, since the baseness itself is in a bad position.
Emotions, however, are one of the driving forces of our behavior, and often tend to put us into the situations that we get ourselves in, in the first place. And as we know, our emotions often tend to direct our behaviors, even if it means that we sometimes do something that could be considered unvirtuous.
The question then arises whether emotions can be an excuse to act unvirtuous in some situations? Aristotle believes that emotion has a rational influence, and is therefore a voluntary action, even if one does not make a deliberate choice. As emotions and the soul are inseparable, as much as the body and soul are inseparable, without the body dying, the body and mind are not able to consciously make its own decision on its emotions. It does, however, mean that the way we react to our emotions is under our control, and therefore constitute to us making a deliberate choice.
Acting on emotions could also show a weakness of will, if we act against our reason. However, that does not mean that we cannot be virtuous. Emotions are a momentary thing. It is not always unvirtuous to act upon them, as sometimes we require emotions to do the right thing. Repeatedly acting on them, without doing the right thing, is the problem. As Aristotle mentions, “the dissipated person, as was said, does not have regrets, since he stands by his choice, but every unrestrained person is capable of regret. Hence things are not as we made out in the impasse, but the former is incurable, and the latter is curable. For vice seems like such diseases as dropsy and consumption, and unrestraint like epileptic seizures, since the former is a continuous bad condition while the latter is not continuous” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1150b30). While it is inconsistent to be an unrestrained man who acts on emotion sometimes, that inconsistence can be cured, and is not so bad as being a person who continuously seeks short pleasure. The difference between the two, seems to be the ability of regret.
Aristotle ended his discussion, in the ethics, by explaining how ethical living is required to achieve true happiness, and pleasure in itself is not good, if one is also not virtuous. “We assume that the gods most of all are blessed and happy, but what sort of action will be right to attribute to them? Acts of justice? … So the being-at-work of a god, surpassing in blessedness, would be contemplative, and so among human activities, the one most akin to this would be the most happy” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1178b10-24). Happiness lies in actions that lead to virtue, even if they are not pleasant in the moment. So, of course, one can act on emotions and always try to be comfortable and happy, and our emotions tend to lead us to making the choices that are pleasant to us in the moment, but if one wants to reach true happiness, then they need to act morally and virtuous, even if it means to sometimes act against one’s initial emotions.