Identify tensions between democracy and rights in an international context and assess whether they raise issues of normative principle.
The values of freedom, respect for human rights and the principle of holding periodic and genuine elections by universal suffrage are essential elements of democracy. In turn, democracy provides the natural environment for the protection and effective realisation of human rights.
United Nations (Un.org, 2017)
Seventy-two years after the founding of the United Nations (UN), there has been a continuous increase in the number of organisations and entities that are dedicated to monitoring the implementation of human rights. Each acquiring greater powers and competences, human rights treaty bodies comprise the nucleus of the international rights regime, seeking to perform their functions at a time when “human rights are in the mainstream and expectations correspondingly high” (Grover, 2012, p.ix). Indeed, it may be argued that a new international order has arisen which requires national and international jurisdiction to be founded upon the principles of human rights and democracy. Certainly, this might not present any cause for concern if the sole end to be achieved was the procurement and dissemination of human rights and democracy. However, institutions which may well be based upon rights, democracy, and social progress nevertheless find their practitioners to be professionals, “[acting] on the basis of technical specialisation, not civic commitment”(Guilhot, 2005, p.3). Such conditions have led to the creation of an insular conclave from which to scrutinise these normative foundations; “a system with its own standards, institutions and mechanisms, a world of experts still far from being intrinsically connected to people’s daily life worlds” (Fortman, 2017). What transpires is the weaponisation of human rights and democracy in such a manner that actively rebels against normative principle and paradoxically undermines the values that are claimed to have been upheld.
In order to fully elucidate this proposition, it is necessary to define democracy, human rights and normative principle. The dynamic between the three in an international context must also be considered when defining the terminology in order to extrapolate where this relationship succeeds and falters, drawing particularly upon any contradictions that may emerge. Furthermore, assessment of the terms in relation to one another is imperative, due to the fact that one is so often defined on the basis that the others correctly function (Campbell, Goldsworthy and Stone, 2005, p.137).
Democracy is notoriously tricky to define. Tom Campbell attributes this difficulty to the fact that “each meaning of democracy is borne of a particular context or a particular historical struggle” (Campbell, Goldsworthy and Stone, 2005, p.138). Thus, if the diversity of opinion varies so wildly when trying to form a suitable definition, it is perhaps sagacious to limit the scope of enquiry, given that without historical context, attempts to define democracy appear indeterminate. As per J. L. Hiebert, “rather than pursuing questions of whether democracy has a normative component, democracy is often assumed to be the sum of current practices of representative government” (Hiebert, 2014, p.116). Democracy is not, then, a description of existing structures and practices, nor is it a means to legitimise past institutions and procedures that have served present democracies. Instead, democracy may be considered an ideal that society aspires to; a system that is constantly evolving which consequently warrants a distinct approach. It is, as S. Marks puts it, one of those concepts where society must take “a provisional approach to their significance, to conceive them as ongoing accomplishments. They are never finished, but have to be constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed in ever-changing circumstances” (Marks, 2010, p. 49). This is not to dismiss existing structures and procedures as undemocratic, but to suggest that there is a distinction between the concept of democracy and an effective political democracy. Hence, this essay shall focus on what factors constitute an effective political democracy, and whether the legal enforcement of human rights can be considered truly democratic.
Structurally, an effective political democracy must “involve notions of self-rule within a community of equals” (Campbell, Goldsworthy and Stone, 2005, p.139). In accordance with R. Dworkin, democracy requires the participation of all citizens, as equals, and decisions taken must treat all with equal concern and respect (Campbell, Goldsworthy and Stone, 2005, p.139; Dworkin, 1996). Statistical conceptions of democracy serve this purpose insofar as political decisions are made “in accordance with some function – a majority or a plurality – of the votes or decisions or wishes of individual citizens” (Bellamy, 1999, p.5). Yet, this is insufficient; statistical conceptions do not necessarily guarantee the participation of all citizens, nor does it guarantee participation of all as equals, and it does not mean that all decisions produced from this form of democracy will be treated with both equal concern and respect. For instance, political apathy in a state can lead to low voter turnout, which obviously does not ensure equal participation by all citizens, and by extension, threatens the legitimacy of the decision-making process. Thus, democracy must be conceived in a manner that will allow for the decision of the majority to be respected from within a community of equals.
A communal definition of democracy satisfies this criteria, notably the principle of democratic inclusion. Broadly speaking, this refers to an “enhancing control by citizens of decision-making which affects them and overcoming disparities in the distribution of citizen rights and opportunities” (Marks, 2010, p. 116). Therefore, in contrast to statistical conceptions of democracy, the principle of democratic inclusion places self-rule and political equality at the forefront of its agenda. In doing so, it is possible to emphasise symbiotic relationships and processes, particularly those that advance self-rule and political equality. This is essential, as it demands far more than simply securing the recurrence of elections, and indeed, the institutional arrangements that come with it. As Jean Bethke Elshtain puts it;
Democracy is not and has never been primarily a means whereby popular will is tabulated and enacted but, rather, a political world within which citizens deliberate, negotiate, compromise, engage, and hold themselves and those they choose to represent them accountable for actions taken…For democracy’s enduring promise is that democratic citizens can come to know a good in common that they cannot know alone.
(Elshtain, 1996)
Moreover, the principle of democratic inclusion recognises democracy as a system of processes, swerving the pitfall of trying to pinpoint a singular definition. This is preferential, as the task at hand does not require the use of definitive meanings, but rather interactions. As previously stated, democracy is constantly in the process of re-contextualising itself. By utilising this principle as a basis for understanding democracy, which is also incomplete and under perpetual construction, we are better equipped to discuss governing structures, their roles, limits, and how rights factor into democratic operationalisation (Campbell, Goldsworthy and Stone, 2005, p.140).
To start, it might be worthwhile to review the deliberative theory of democracy; not only does it take into account democratic evolution, the necessity of self-rule and political equality, but it factors in all of the above to expound on what may be considered as the basis of all rights. The theory emphasises democracy as a system whereby preferences are developed through an ongoing dialogue, which, in the absence of a unanimity will be interrupted by the majority’s verdict (Campbell, 1997). The verdict is, however, provisional; it is a compromise made by citizens until further agreement can come to pass. Yet, this does not mean that a consensus is expected to be reached, nor is it a priority. Rather, the deliberative theory of democracy allots importance to maintaining the free exchange of ideas and the encouragement of debate (Campbell, 1997). This is essential, as it recognises the capacity of each individual citizen to deliberate and engage in making choices between rival concepts for the sake of the common good. These alternatives must be ever present, and choice between alternatives must not be impeded.
As N. Bobbio states, “the fundamental feature of modern democracy is based on the principle that dissent…does not undermine
whether legislative action based on human rights is antithetical to democracy, or
Given that the task at hand is to address the relationship between
edify the credibility of one state or group of actors, at the expense of others