Paste your essay in here…VA: AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL JOURNEY
Introduction
The image of India is often dominated by the presence of the grand Taj Mahal, a monument which belongs to Islamic, not Hindu culture. Despite the fact that the Mughal rule in India was as much a foreign invasion as the British Raj, it was one of the very few times when India stood unified as a subcontinent. It is believed that before this period, there were only some regional and short lived-Hindu kingdoms. Flood argued that historically the Persians and the Greeks used the word ‘Hindu’ to simply refer to people living around or beyond the river Sindhu or Indus (1996: 6). Lipner explained that in the contemporary period, the word Hindu has been used to refer to those residents of India who are not Muslims, Jains, Christians, Buddhists, and so on (2012: 17-18). Since Hindus form the largest ethnic group in India, one often mistakenly equates being Hindu with being Indian, and Hinduism as the only religion of India. Flood also mentioned that the ‘-ism’ was added to ‘Hindu’ in around 1830 to refer to a culture and religion of the high-caste Brahmins, and the term was eventually appopriated to build a national identity (1996: 6).
In order to survive the changing times, Hinduism is known to have tailored itself to welcome and adapt to the different thought-structures, dogmas, ritualistic beliefs that it encountered over the decades. However, there are a few basic characteristics that remained central to the idea of Hinduism. Brockington explains a few significant features of Hinduism, while claiming that they are inadequate to provide a robust definition (1996: 4). First, he believes that the caste system plays an important role in forming the Hindu society, although there have been numerous teachers and proponents of Hinduism who have rejected caste divisions (1996: 2). Second, the practice of vegetarianism and the doctrine of non-violence (ahimsa) is a major ethical issue in Hinduism; however, it cannot be the defining principle of Hinduism as it is too “superficial” (1996: 4). Brockington argues that vegetarianism is over-simplified, as it is the standard practice of the elite group, the Brahmins, but has never been universal since the lower caste Hindus could not afford meat (1996: 3). The veneration of the cow seems to have connections with the principle of non-violence. Brockington argues that it owes more to the economic importance of the cow at an early period, which made its slaughter undersiable (1996: 4). He thus claims that the belief in the sanctity of the cow is too superficial to define Hinduism. Lastly, Brockington claims that the Vedas (scriptures belonging to the Vedānta school of Indian philosophy) are considered the sole source of true religion in Hinduism, and the rejection of its authority led to the foundation of Buddhism and Jainism as separate religions (1996: 5). However, he goes on to argue that in reality the Vedas are not read by the vast majority of Hindus, as most of them being lower castes and women were forbidden to read it.
For the purpose of clarity, the author would define Hinduism as a tradition that has prospered and evolved in India, owing to innumerable beliefs and practices that sustain it. Hinduism has developed and reinvented itself considerably. For this very reason, it is crucial to engage in the history of the tradition and the events that thus shaped it, so as to gain a comprehensive perspective of the nature of Hinduism. The course of this essay has not been able to define Hinduism concretely, because we often try to see Hinduism as one religion. It would make our task a lot easier if we tried explaining it as a socio-cultural unit or a tradition which is essentially pluralistic. It is only natural that the ideas that define Hinduism often overlap. The essay does not suggest that one idea is more accurate than the other. However, it would be sound to argue that these varied perspectives, although, cannot be reconciled, but can exist as independent ideas under the umbrella term of Hinduism.
The evolution of the Hindu tradition, along with the way in which history of India has influenced Hinduism allows one to believe in the dynamic nature of Hinduism. To gain an epistemological understanding of the evolution of Hinduism, the first section of the essay seeks to follow the historical and the philosophical trajectory of the tradition, and the changes it underwent over the years. The second section deals with the inclusive and exclusive definitions of Hinduism. One may also observe here the contrast in the philosophy of Hinduism as was propounded by Gandhi, Vivekananda and so on, to that of the controversial Hindutva philosophy and ethnic nationalism popularized by Savarkar, which was later adopted by the Sangh Parivar for their political ends. The third section of the essay discusses the impact of colonialism and orientalism in shaping Hinduism, and also analyzes the the role of Hinduism in contemporary political mobilization. In conclusion, the author argues that the fundamental principles of Hinduism (as were laid by Gandhi and Radhakrishnan) promote harmony and tolerance, rather than the idea of ethnic cleansing and chauvinism found in the contemporary politics of India.
Hinduism: A Background
The ease with which Hinduism has absorbed the beliefs and ideas of different people is as significant as the difficulty encountered while finding a common feature that binds together these different ideas. Zaehner asserts that the ancient forms of Hinduism are rather different from the ones practised in the contemporary age. He writes that Hinduism can historically be divided into four distinct periods (1966: 8). The earliest of all is the period of the Rig Veda (oldest collection of Sanskrit hymns), which he claims is similar to other Indo-European religions (1996: 8). The second phase is the form of Hinduism that lays stress on liberation of the human soul from time, space, and matter. This is considered the highest religious truth for many. Zaehner goes on to the third phase of Hinduism, which he considers the most important—the development of “strong monotheistic trends on the one hand and the crystallization and ossification of the caste system on the other” (1966: 9). He calls Hinduism as much a social system as a religion. He claims that the presuppositions of transmigration, the belief in liberation, the cycle of birth-rebirth form the ideological framework of Hinduism, whereas the caste system forms the social framework. Zaehner goes on to say that the caste system has until very recently, “become increasingly rigid, increasingly complicated, and increasingly identified with Hinduism as such” (1966: 10). The fourth phase, is the one we are living through today—the reassertion of spiritual essence. Zaehner claims that this phase was the result of reform movement of the nineteenth century, however, it was popularized only by the advent of “a saint who seemed to incarnate all that was best in Hinduism, Mahatma Gandhi” (1996: 11).
In laying out the historical development of Hinduism, Zaehner argues that although it was once possible to define a Hindu as the one who abides by the caste laws, and accepts the authority of the Vedas, such is not the case anymore. This is because to understand the modern-day Hinduism what was once considered to be fundamental must be now discarded. Zaehner’s analysis though broad and simplistic, does overlook a few key aspects of historical development of Hinduism. He does not mention the exact dates in the division of the four phases, which weakens his argument. Secondly, he ignores the impact of advent of other religions on the development of Hinduism, for instance the rise of Buddhism, Jainism and Islam is known to have significantly affected Hinduism. One might also find it evident that Zaehner misses to mention the post-independence period of Hinduism, which is essential to the contemporary understanding of the Hindu tradition.
While Zaehner fails to recognize the impact of important aspects like that of other religions, the British era, and post-independence period, Radhakrishnan, by romanticizing the idea of Hinduism, refers to various events that shaped Hinduism. Radhakrishnan argues that while Hinduism has not sufficiently benefited from its experience of Islam, the “monotheistic elements of Hinduism have become more emphasized after the spread of Islam in India” (2015: 68). He goes on to say that Hinduism could learn more from Islam. He asserts that Hinduism “need not give up its tolerance”, but make sure that its judgment of values is kept up, and urges that we must “democratize our institutions and do away with wrangling creeds, unintelligible dogmas and oppressive institutions…” (2015: 69). He argues that outsiders have always flown into the Hindu fold, and the religion has been able to “absorb and inspire heterogeneous people…” (2015: 25). He corroborates this argument by giving the example of Dara Shukoh, the great grandson of Akbar, who wrote a work on the union of the two oceans [of Hinduism and Islam], as he recognised that the two religions were equally efficient in helping us to live higher life” (2015: 56). Radhakrishnan believes that through the interaction of Islam and Hinduism, “India’s vision of harmonising the different religious systems that have met on her soil will be promoted” (2015: 59).
Moving on to the present day Hinduism, Radhakrishnan claims that in the contemporary world, politics have absorbed life, and the “State is invading society” (2015: 20). He argues that the modern worldly reformers justify that the practise of “violence, abundance of possessions and armaments are the final end of man’s life” because they believe “thou shalt not hate except the backwards races, the enemy nations and the weak of the world” (2015: 33). Radhakrishnan believes that we must allow “absolute freedom to every group to cultivate what is most distinctive and characteristic of it”, because Hinduism believes that every group and every nation is worthy of reverence and does not believe in enforcing creeds (2012: 33). He also claims that wars of religion which are the “outcome of fanaticism” that justify extermination of “aliens of different creeds” were never encouraged by Hinduism (2012: 36). Radhakrishnan’s view of Hinduism, therefore, clearly affirms that the tradition is capable of embracing the whole of humanity without the “employment of force or eagerness for exploitation” (2015: 49).
Inclusive Hinduism Versus Exclusive Hindusim
Zaehner’s belief that Gandhi brought about the best in Hinduism seems like an accurate assertion for a number of reasons (1996: 11). Gandhi argued that the fundamental truth for a Hindu should be to endeavour to be a better Hindu, for a Muslim to be a better Muslim, and so on (1950: 15). He strongly argued that there was “no such thing as proselytism in Hinduism”, because all religions were equally good (1950: 15). He explained Hinduism’s stance against proselytism by implying that just like one’s own mother is best for oneself, so is one’s religion the best, each for himself (1950: 238). Therefore, one might take the liberty of claiming that Gandhi’s idea of Hinduism strongly valued religious tolerance. Here, Sharma clarifies that although Gandhi believed in religious tolerance, he categorically claimed that it must not be confused with approval of any kind, since Hinduism has a vigourous tradition of debate and discussion (1996: 64). Sharma himself propounds a universal idea of Hinduism. He begins to understand contemporary Hinduism, by presupposing a truism¬—time changes, and thus a tradition can only be transmitted as a dialogue between change and continuity (1996: 5). By appealing to the dynamic and pluralistic nature of Hinduism, Sharma urges for an “alliance among the liberal elements for all the religions…to enhance tolerance in a religiously pluralistic world” (1996: 69).
Gandhi blatantly rejected the concept of Untouchability in the name of caste-division. He dined with the Untouchables to send a strong message of brotherhood and equality in a pre-independent India, which stood divided. Lastly, with reference to the Vedas, Gandhi claimed that he would not perform an activity, simply because the Vedas have advised, tolerated or sanctioned it (1950: 173). This was primarily because he held that the mere knowledge of the Vedas did not make one a pious Brahmin or Hindu. He considered Vedic learning to be secondary, in comparision with starvation and hunger that persisted in the world (1950: 11). Heredia argues that Gandhi did not separate religion from politics, rather he brought a “religious ethic” to politics instead of political militancy into religious communities (2009: 62). Therefore, it is often held that Gandhi changed the paradigm of Hinduism.
Heredia argues that the present day national crisis of violence and communal conflicts clearly represent a choice between the inclusiveness of Gandhi and the exclusions of Savarkar (2009: 62). He goes on to say that despite its nationalist and modern aspects, Savarkar’s “militant chauvinism” and “authoritarian fundamentalism” make his notion of Hindutva (or Hinduness) the antithesis of Gandhi’s Hinduism (2009: 62). Heredia also compares Savarkar’s Hindutva to that of Vivekananda’s Hinduism with respect to their purposes. He asserts that Vivekananda was not a political chauvinst or a religious communalist. Vivekananda only implored the spread of Indian spirituality, of which Hinduism is a mere part. Vivekananda’s ideal strategy was to create such a system of traditions that would be defensible against and superior to the Western ideology of materialism. Van der Veer argues that it was Vivekananda’s promotion of the “ancient system of yoga” which is now India’s main export article on the “spirituality market” (1994: 70). Heredia also asserts that Vivekananda’s objective to Hinduise India and universalize Hinduism was only a spiritual endeavour, not a political step, unlike Savarkar’s motto of Hinduising politics and militarising Hindudom (2009: 67).
On the other extreme end, Savarkar articulates Hindutva as a political ideology of ethno-religious nationalism, with the aim to unify and mobilize the inegalitarian classes among Hindus under a communal banner (1989). His notion of Hindutva promotes religious as well as national identity, i.e., an Indian is essentially a Hindu. However, it is often argued that religious and nationalist discourses are entirely separate from, and even opposed to each other (Nandy, 1991). Nandy asserts that Hinduism is a way of life, whereas Savarkar’s Hindutva is “an ideology for those whose Hinduism has worn off” (1991). Savarkar rigourously designs the very exclusive nature of Hinduism, by othering all that does not fall under the ambit of his air-tight definition of Hinduness. Through an extremely aggressive approriation of nationalism by Hindu majoritarianism, and indigenous origin of religion, Savarkar branded all the non-Hindu Indians as foreigners, and treacherous. He laid out three essentials for a person to be identified as a Hindu—nation, race, and civilization (1989: 101). He defined Hinduism as necessarily a “religion(s) that are peculiar and native to this land and people” (1989: 104). Therefore, Islam and Christianity were set in opposition to Hinduism because these two religions represented for Savarkar an otherness of a threatening nature.
Over time, Hindutva overlapped and was conflated with Hinduism in the popular projection. For example, Justice J.S. Verma in his remarks in a Supreme Court judgment in 1995 concerning the political use of religion opined that Hindutva is nothing but Hinduism. This was widely quoted by the Sangh Parivar to legitimise its intolerant and aggressive ideology. It was only after the Gujrat riots of 2002, that Justice Verma claimed that his words had been misconstrued. The opponents of Hindutva philosophy consider the ideology of Hindutva as a euphemistic effort to conceal communal beliefs and practices. Eck holds that Savarkar’s vision of Hindutva is “more political…more rhetoric…more oriented to the language of communal identity than the reality of religious practice” (2012: 99). Social scientists have described the Hindutva movement as fascist, which targets the concept of homogenised majority and cultural hegemony (Patnaik, 1993). Critics often describe the ideology of the Sangh Parivar in terms of Indian fascism and Hindu fascism. Patnaik bases his argument on the following ingredients of classical fascism present in Hindutva—the attempt to create a unified homogeneous majority under the concept of the Hindus; a sense of grievance against past injustice; a sense of cultural superiority; an interpretation of history according to this grievance and superiority; a rejection of rational arguments against this interpretation; and an appeal to the majority based on race and masculinity (1993). The nature of society and politics is changing in India. The multiplicities of different groups are often brought together in the form of monolithic structures. While these social structures, on one hand, bind the various groups into one, they also lead to alienation at another level, as smaller groups may go unnoticed. More often than not, the moulding of religion by religious extremists offends those for whom religion is a personal, and sensitive affair.
Colonialism and Orientalism
Thapar argues that in the multiplicity of communalisms present in India in the modern-day, Hindu communalism is the major one, since it involves the largest numbers, and asserts itself as the most dominant group (1989: 210). She argues that the modern construction of Hinduism has an obvious historical causation. She claims that derviving largely from Orientalist construction of Hinduism—the integration of a vast collection of myths, rituals, beliefs into coherent religion and rational faith—the “emergent national consciousness appropriated this definiton of Hinduism” (1989: 229). Strachey argues that there is not and never was an India until the British had arrvied (1888). Orientalists like Said would argue that it was only after colonialism that India’s history and conception began to merge with the idea of nationhood. Pandey, on the other hand, argues that communalism is an oritentalist term, which was coined to describe the otherness of politics in the East, but has now been employed by the secular nationalists to refer to the illegitimacy of religious nationalism (1990: 8). For example, the temple-mosque controversy of Ayodhya has now become a symbol of communalism in the Indian political scenario. Sarkar states that it is important to understand the difference between communalism and community consciousness, because the former is often equated with “firmly bounded religious identity” (2002: 219).
After the 1857 rebellion in India, the British undertook a project to classify and control the vast population of India. First, they collected data on caste, and then divided the population into religious communities. Although the census operations that began in 1872 derived the classifications (of endogamous groups of castes) on the basis of classical Hindu texts, they did make the social divisions rigid. It was the census operations that established and institutionalised a Hindu majority and a Muslim minority, which later became the basis of electoral politics. Although this does not entail that social divisions did not exist in the pre-colonial era, but only suggests the advent of religious nationalism. Sarkar claims that census operations further necessitated the drawing of sharp social distinctions, because the enumerated communities “made for mutual competition, helped to produce complaints about unfair representation in education, jobs, adminitration or politics, and stimulated fears about being left behind in numbers games” (2002: 225). However, some might also argue that the British commitment was not to communalism, but they had their own particular end in mind. For instance, Chandra argues that the objective of the divide and rule policy was not a perverse one (1984: 246). He asserts that it was a mere “political instrument” and a “part of a broader political strategy of maintaining colonialism in the face of the nationalist challenge” (1984: 246). It is only fair to assume that the British policy of divide and rule succeeded only because certain pre-existing internal conditions favoured it.
When Jinnah’s two-nation theory was dismissed by the Congress, the British encouraged total communal division, and openly supported the Muslim League. The British promoted communalism in a number of ways. Firstly, they regarded the Muslims as a separate social and political entity, by replacing religion with nationality. Chandra pinpoints that the roles assigned to parties began to be assigned to communities, and consequently, the government approached all questions of politics, administration etc., on a communal basis (1984: 261). He also refers to the “official encouragement to communalism” by supporting denominational universities, such as the Benares Hindu University and the Aligarh Muslim University that would give religious instruction, and thus keep alive the antagonistic feelings (1994: 264). Eventually, the system of separate electorates, along with reservation of seats and weightage in representation to the minorities cemented communal politics in India.
Political Mobilization
Thapar argues that the need for postulating a Hindu community became a neccesity for “political mobilization” in the nineteenth century, because “representation by religious community became a key to power”, and such representation gave “access to economic resources” (1989: 229). Therefore, it became increasingly important to recruit as many people as possible into the fold of the community. The practice of ‘conversion’ to Hinduism was introduced mainly to bring the Untouchables, and the tribals under the Hindu fold. Moreover, the concept of purification or śuddhi was invented to bring back those people to Hinduism, who had been converted to Islam or Christianity previously. Thapar states that in such a political scenario, the vagueness of what constituted a Hindu became advantageous for those propagating a Hindu community, because it led to an almost “new perception of the social and political uses of religion” (1989: 230). Alluding to Gramsci’s theory, Thapar argues that the “class which wishes to become hegemonic has to nationalize itself and the new nationalist Hinduism comes from the middle class” (1989: 230). Therefore, the majority community began to define the national aspirations. The minority communities, on the other hand, began to be seen as disrupting the society as they refused to conform to the standards laid down by the ruling group. Thapar believes that these minority communities are often projected as those that have always been “alien to the dominant culture and therefore refusing to assimilate with the majority” (1989: 230). Since its foundation the RSS has actively promoted anti-Muslim militancy. What is ironical is that the RSS has its roots in Hindu traditions, yet it accepts neither Gandhi’s idea of tolerance, nor Vivekananda’s construction of spirituality. Van der Veer argues that this kind of Hindu nationalism “demands that the state be the instrument of the political will of its Hindu majority, and its choice of action gives Muslims a justified feeling of being an endangered majority” (1994: 10). The growing religious activism in politics is not an organic phenomenon. For instance, the temple-mosque controversy did not arise naturally. It was the result of consciously planned religious and political actions, and hence, is significant in portraying the changing political sketch of India.
With the rise of religious extremism, it is getting difficult to maintain a secular state. Moreover, the vote-bank politics is eroding the fabric of democracy in India. It doesn’t matter if the vote-bank politics is based on religion, or caste, or both, because eventally it leads to mayhem and murder. Bringing back the issue of building a temple, where a mosque stands in the manifesto of the BJP in the recent UP elections is a corroboration of this argument. Sociologists like Nandy agree that one of the Sanskrit synonyms for Brahmins—upper caste Hindus, in some parts of India was goghanas, or those who ate beef (1980). However, the beef ban and cow politics in Uttar Pradesh leads one to only imagine the drastic shift of Hinduism towards ethnic nationalism and fascism. On being asked in an interview the relationship between Hindutva and economic growth and development in India, Jaffrelot replied that Plan A for the Modi government would to be succeed on the economic front. However, if that does not work then emphasizing on Hindutva politics may be an important Plan B, because this is what BJP does when it wants to conquer difficult seats or fears electorate defeat like in the case of Gujrat in 2002 (Scroll, 2014).
Conclusion
Sharma argues that “every Hindu decides what Hinduism is. The space ought to remain inviolable. It is a space worth living for and dying for” (2003: 13). Who a Hindu is, what he believes in, or how he identifies himself are questions that cannot have one right answer. The four ways to understand Hinduism (inclusiveness, exclusivesness, colonialism and orientalism, and political mobilization) are only broader interpretations of what Hinduism is, and they certainly overlap. However, the only certain philosophy of Hinduism is that it appreciates and accepts the faiths and traditions that are not its own. The meddling of the State with the social framework is not what Hinduism was founded upon. The English word ‘religion’ comes from the Latin root ligare, which means to bind. Therefore, the foundation of every religion is to bind people together in an ordered world, instead of pitching one community against another only to serve a political end. Eck states that “Hindus and Muslims alike paid visits to the dargahs in the centuries past, just as they do today” (2012: 92). Eck believes that this not only includes the love of the soil of its dargahs but also the love of its cities like Delhi, and Surat love of its Gangā waters, which Muhammad bin Tughlaq had carried south for his use when he moved his capital from Delhi to Daulatabad (2012: 93). Moreover, she argues that the “Indo-Muslim experience cannot be comprehended by seeing Indian Muslims as yearning for a pan-Muslim world, centered in Mecca” (2012: 93). Jalal also points out that it is their “religiously informed cultural identity that has lent historical complexity and depth to the Muslim’s relationship with the watan or homeland [India]” (2002: 10).
Many modern scholars have wrestled with the problem of nationalism in the contemporary period, as this has been the time which saw new forms of nationalism, most of them based on race, religion, ideology, and even soil itself. Tagore provides an answer to this politcal game by arguing for “the social regulation of differences, on the one hand, and the spiritual recognition of unity on the other” (2002: 55). The philosophy of Hinduism never promotes uniformity, because the Hindu thinkers have known that uniforminty does not entail unity, only harmony and coexistence do. Radhakrishnan argues that even the State in India is a servant of dharma—code of conduct supported by the general conscience of the people. He goes on to state that the function of the State is not to alter dharma but to administer it (2015: 19). The richness of Hinduism lies in its diversity, and therefore, the Hindu nationalist propaganda of Hindutva is completely against the foundation of Hinduism. The premise of conservatism—it has always been thus— ignores the fundamentals of the theory of relativity in philosophy and practice, and in politics and society. Radhakrishnan argues that to believe that India has stood still for centuries is incorrect, because while there has been continuity with the past, there has also been progress (2012: 94). Therefore, the need of the hour is to look at the ancient faith of Hinduism with a fresh and liberal perspective, and commit ourselves to readjusment rather than religious fanaticism. One must acknowledge that Hinduism alone does not define India for its history has been greatly influenced by Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism, and so on. Thus, as citizens of a modern state, it is only reasonable to evolve a way of living with our differences, in harmony and coexistence.