Introduction
When compared to the 7 million Ukrainian deaths of the Holodomor or the tens of millions of victims of the Great Chinese Famine, the ‘mere’ 1 million deaths and 2 million citizens who emigrated during the Irish Potato Famine may not seem significant. However, proportionately the fatalities of the Irish Famine were of a much larger magnitude, resulting in the island of Ireland losing a quarter of its population in just seven years (Kelly 2).
During the 1800s, Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, and Britain’s government was in charge of all domestic affairs within Ireland. The majority of the Irish were poor farmers who grew crops on small pieces of land which they rented from English landlords. Potatoes were the main crop grown in Ireland, as they were cheap and easy to grow, however this dependency left millions of people starving and helpless when the potato blight struck in 1945. The Irish had nothing left to eat, and could only look to the British government for help.
The research question which this essay will explore is,
“To what extent were the British Whig government’s economic policies culpable for the effects of the Potato Famine on the Irish population from 1846 to 1852?”.
This topic is important to investigate because it is the worst catastrophe in Ireland’s history, and it is crucial to understand what could cause and exacerbate such a devastating event. People who would be interested in this topic would include, Irish and British citizens and the tens of millions of Irish diaspora, and more specifically, politicians and economists who wish to expand their knowledge of how certain national crises, such as famines, should (or should not) be dealt with.
Furthermore, the Irish Famine’s legacy still plays a role in modern day politics. This is most evident in towns such as Belcoo in Northern Ireland, which lost 25% of its population during the Famine. A stone bridge connects this village with the town of Blacklion in the Republic of Ireland, and the inhabitants of these villages are bound tightly together by their shared history of the Famine. As Brexit negations continue, these towns fear nothing more than a hard border between them, as such a border could cause severe unrest due to the unique bond which the Famine has created between them (McDonald).
Three concepts which are key to exploring this historical topic are cause, consequence and perspective. This research question explores factors which caused the effects of the famine – which include the Whig policies. Consequence is evident in the topic as it requires understanding of the devastating effects of the famine. However, perspective is perhaps the most significant concept, as this particular topic is highly debated between various historians. One group of historians, often named Irish nationalists, argue that the Whig government’s inaction was very much responsible for the effects the famine had on Ireland. Meanwhile, a second group named revisionist historians, tend to play down the British government’s role. Counter-revisionist historians blend the two perspectives together by recognising the government should have done more, but also acknowledging the relief efforts that were made. To enrich my analysis further, I will be gathering primary sources such diary entries, government documents and newspaper articles of the time which give invaluable insight into the views of the Irish public and the British government.
In 2012, Tim Pat Coogan, who is often considered a nationalist historian, published a book named ‘The Famine Plot: England's Role in Ireland's Greatest Tragedy’. The publication claimed that the Whig government’s policies were nearly entirely culpable for the effects of the Famine. While its publication was met with praise from some Irish historians and politicians, others were outraged by the argument presented, and were quick to counter Coogan’s claims, causing the Famine debate to resurface in Ireland. Due to the re-emergence of this discussion, this essay will use Coogan’s argument as a focus, and will analyse his views by challenging them with other historians and authors, and evaluating these perspectives too.
The Economic Policies of The Whig Government
Food Exports
From 1846 onwards, the British Whig government allowed exports to continue coming out of Ireland. Tim Pat Coogan argues that these unregulated food exports were a major cause leading to the devastating effects of the Famine. Hundreds upon thousands of tons of grain left Irish ports between the years 1846-48, and additionally 83% of beef and 86% of pork was being exported to Britain since the early 1800s (70). Furthermore, Coogan emphasises the psychological impact of seeing these goods leave the country, which is well captured in one starving inhabitant’s exclamation ‘“Would to God the government would send us food instead of soldiers” (Woodham-Smith 134). This demonstrates the confusion of the Irish people when they saw exported food being guarded by British soldiers, while they simply starved to death. Due to these exports, families across Ireland were left with little to nothing in the form of foodstuffs, and this leads Coogan to claim that exports had detrimental effects on the Irish population (Coogan 70).
In response, counter-revisionist historian Cormac O’Grada estimates that exported food amounted to only a seventh of the failed potato crop. He claims 430,000 tons of grain was exported from 1846-47, while 20 million tons of potatoes were lost during this time (Coogan 69). Therefore, preventing these exports would not have prevented much starvation, therefore, the Whig government was not completely to blame. It is important to note that the number of tons of grain exported are not 100% accurate in any statistics as the official documents from the time were somewhat flawed (Kineally Food Exports from Ireland). Nevertheless, O’Grada is among the most respected historians of the Famine, so we may assume that these figures were taken from the most reliable source available, or are otherwise a well-informed estimation. By profession O’Grada is actually an economist, however this only adds to his value as the matter of exports is an economic matter in nature.
However, Coogan makes an important point to counter O’Grada’s argument. While exports only amounted to the value of a seventh of the entire potato crop, this means that hundreds of thousands of Irishmen still died as a result of these exports (Coogan 69). Just because the exports from Ireland had a small economic effect, does not imply that they had a negligible humanitarian effect. Moreover, it was still morally incorrect to let thousands die in the name of free trade, when this could easily have been avoided through regulation.
One must also take into account that food was also imported into Ireland during the worst of the famine years. John Mitchell, one of the most prominent nationalist figures in Ireland at the time, believed that the volume of grain exported vastly outnumbered the amount which was imported. In his publication, The Last Conquest of Ireland, he claimed “a government ship sailing into any harbour with Indian corn, was sure to meet half a dozen sailing out with Irish wheat and cattle” (Mitchell 112). However, Mitchell’s claim here is simply false as imports actually outnumbered exports during the worst Famine years, as shown in the table. Mitchell was one of the leading figures in Irish nationalist journalism during the Famine and for this reason, his various publications and views are of major value. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware, that much of his work aimed to incite anger towards the British government, rather than giving an accurate and balanced report. For this reason, his views were often very biased, even Anglophobic, and at times his claims were simply incorrect (Kelly 309-310).
The revisionist view of Robert Dudley Edwards should also be taken into account. Edwards underlines that fact that food exports outnumbered imports 5 to 1 from September 1st 1846 to July 1st 1847. He goes on to say that Indian Corn imports were three times greater than Ireland’s total cereal exports, and that the import of wheat dwarfed the oats exports during this period. This evidence would lead one to believe that the Whig administration’s laissez-faire policy was largely successful. R.D. Edwards also defends Prime Minister John Russel, as he claims there were to many political forces at work, for Russel to send direct aid to Ireland even if he had wanted to (p.353-354).
To explore why exports were still responsible for mass starvation, we must dig further into detail. Most food exports left Irish ports in early autumn of 1946, while imports did not arrive until the beginning of the following year. This left a four-month gap in which the Irish people had nothing to eat, leading to thousands died across the country (Kelly 143). If the government had intervened and prohibited the export of food until early 1847 this period of mass starvation could have been avoided. A policy of free trade may have been effective; however, it is evident that there were periods during the Famine when the Whig government simply had a moral obligation to intervene. Nonetheless, it is clear that Coogan’s claim that exports were a major cause is only true to some degree, as free trade benefitted Ireland in the bigger picture.
The Public Works
When discussing the success of the public works scheme, Tim Pat Coogan claims ‘Overall, the work schemes were in shambles’ (109). The works schemes were indeed a mess, as the economic theory behind the policy did not function in practice. According to Coogan, only 10 pence per day were being paid to each worker, which was not nearly sufficient to keep a family alive at the time. Rising food prices only exacerbated the problem, as one stone of Indian meal would cost 2 pound 2 shillings by November 1846. One report written by a relief official reads “Ten pence a day will, I believe, only give one meal a day to a family of six persons” (Coogan 112). These type of reports are of immense value, as it indicates that the British government was aware of that their policies were not functioning. The fact that they refused to change their approach, remaining undecided on the matter of fair wages, while knowing the program did very little to prevent starvation, suggests the administration was considerably culpable (Harzallah).
Cormac O’Grada offers an alternative view however. He argues that the public works program was a success in bureaucratic terms, as 90% of the money provided for the program went to the labourers as wages. Furthermore, by Mid-March of 1847, one man per family was employed in the public works in the west of Ireland (58), and by this time there were nearly 750,000 Irishmen employed in the public works. This was a substantial amount of people, considering Ireland’s population in 1841 had been 8.1 million. Bearing in mind that most families in Ireland were very large, consisting of up to 8 or 9 children, this meant that there was nearly one adult in every family earning money on the public works.
Nevertheless, the wages which these men did earn were rarely enough to support a family of 10 or 11, as food prices had continued to rise. John Kelly claims that it some areas wages were as low as 8 pence per day, which would hardly support a family of 4 (148). Moreover, at the beginning of October, only 26,000 workers were employed in the works scheme, and Kelly criticises the inefficiency and lack of organisation extensively. In September of 1846, the Board of Works agency only had 125 members, and had millions of applications to sort through, which resulted in very few people being hired. Other issues included funding of the scheme – as there was a shortage of construction tools and at times there was not enough currency for workers to be paid (Kelly 147). However, Kelly does not utilise these facts to conclude that the scheme was a complete disaster, but rather he simply presents the evidence. While as a writer Kelly may be limited in his credibility due to being only an author – not a historian – John Kelly’s novel ‘The Graves are Walking’ is valuable in its content as it provides a balanced and factual discussion of the Famine, and does not attempt to persuade the audience into agreeing with any particular perspective.
One of the most prominent, and often hated, figures of the Famine, Charles Trevelyan, claims the public works scheme was successful due to the fact that new infrastructure was built throughout Ireland. These roads would make transportation more efficient and benefit Irish society in general (Trevelyan 180). As Trevelyan was the chief administrator for relief in Ireland, he attempts to paint Whig polices in a very positive light, regardless of the policy. Therefore, his writing often has a great degree of bias to it, yet in this case Robert Dudley Edwards supports Trevelyan’s claim to an extent. He argues that the improvement of road communication was an essential part of economic development. Moreover, schemes of local development, especially in waste lands would have had great success. Nevertheless, Edwards, having the benefit of hindsight and taking several other perspectives into account, acknowledges that these projects were limited in their success due to many being left unfinished and others being planned poorly (Edwards 340). Roads often began nowhere and led to nowhere and were simply not suitable for communication or transportation (Griffiths 638). While Edwards is a revisionist historian, he considers both sides of the argument, and comes to a somewhat balanced conclusion. Furthermore, his book ‘The Great Famine’ is of further value as it is written together with nearly a dozen other authors, some of which are historians, some economists (including Cormac O’Grada), and even Medical and English professors. Therefore, the content of the publication is relatively balanced through taking numerous perspectives into account.
Taking all points into account, it would be fair to conclude that Coogan’s claim of the work schemes being in shambles has a great degree of truth in it, due to the lack of organisation and the government’s failure to regulate wages.
Soup Kitchens and Workhouses
The only large scale relief program which Tim Pat Coogan gives much credit to were the soup kitchens, as they were the most effective solution to preventing further starvation. While the quality of soup varied significantly, any type of soup was an improvement compared to what the Irish population had before. Furthermore, Coogan also explains that the kitchens had wide spread results; providing soup with piece of bread or biscuit for 3 million people every day at its peak in August 1847. Edwards pursues this matter, and adds that in May 777,884 persons had received rations from the kitchens, and in June this number had already shot up to 2,729,684. While these numbers indicate that this relief method was successful in its far-reaching effects, the fact that a nationalist and revisionist historian agree on this matter emphasize the achievement of the soup kitchens.
Nevertheless, John Kelly points out that there were still problems. Although nearly a million people were receiving soup during May of 1847, only half of the 2000 planned soup kitchens across the country had been opened (Kelly 252). The areas which did not have access to kitchens yet, were often the most isolated and rural regions of the country, where the people had also struggled to find employment at the public works. These families had hardly any foodstuff available to them, and this led to mass starvation. Another criticism is the Whig administration’s plan to shut down the soup kitchens later that year, due to their belief that the free market would solve the food crisis thereafter. This was expected to work as farmers would plant their potato seed once again, however, Kelly explains that as most of the potato seed had been eaten during the winter when food was scarcest. Additionally, farmers who could grow the potato crop chose not to, in fear of the land owners taking most of it away (Kelly 253). As a result, the potato market did not re-emerge in Ireland, and the country continued to suffer in a state of famine.
The workhouses are often seen as the most significant failed relief effort of the famine, and Coogan shares this view by stating ‘The workhouse system neither could, nor was designed to, cope with the conditions in famine-stricken Ireland’. Coogan claims the Whig government drastically misjudged the practicality of the workhouses, as the poor law commissioner who had suggested them, had done so assuming only 1% of the Irish population were in need of aid. Nevertheless, Trevelyan was still determined to administer workhouses throughout Ireland leading to disastrous consequences. (Coogan 132) Coogan points out roughly 45% of Ireland population at the time were in need of relief (Population of Ireland 1841-2011), which lead him to conclude that the workhouses would be incapable of dealing with the famine.
Cecil Woodham-Smith, an expert on Victorian era history, agrees with Coogan on this matter, and furthers it through investigating the conditions in the workhouses. She argues that life inside was no better than outside, as food quickly ran out as a result of overcrowding, and diseases such as fever and flu, spread quickly in the cram-full environment (193). In addition to there being food and even water shortages, there was also a lack of clothing (238), which added to the diseased atmosphere. Woodham-Smith is a greatly respected historian, partially due to her staunch rejection of the British revisionist view, and instead chooses to bring to light the horrific effects of Whig administration’s policies. This was seen as a major step in Irish Famine historiography, and therefore her work is of great value. Moving on, a charity worker at one of the workhouses described the floor as being ‘strewed with a little dirty straw’ and said that children were ‘littered down as close as close might be’ (Irish Potato Famine Exhibition). This primary source gives us further insight into how overcrowded and unhygienic the conditions were, and nearly suggests to us that the people in these workhouses were living like animals. Although the author’s name is not known, we may assume that they don’t voice an overly biased opinion as they were at the workhouse simply as a charity worker.
Meanwhile, members of the government still insisted that the workhouses were successful. In his memoirs of ‘The Irish Crisis’, Charles Trevelyan claimed that ‘[l]arge supplies of clothing were … sent to Ireland for use of the workhouses’. He goes on to claim that sums of money were lent in order to help the workers in the workhouses provide food and clothing. While some supplies and support may have been sent, the descriptions which modern historians have put forward clearly indicate that this support was in no way adequate for those inside the workhouses. This account given by Trevelyan reveals his pro-government bias once again, which is evidently a massive limitation to the information he provides on this occasion.
Considering these factors, Coogan’s view of the soup kitchens being a success and workhouses being quite a disaster is shared by the majority of historians, and are relatively accurate generalisations.
Emigration Assistance
Regarding the government’s role in emigration from Ireland, Tim Pat Coogan states ‘What was needed to avert an inevitable disaster was a humane system of assisted emigration’ (32). He argues that due to the disastrous land system, the failing administration and inadequate infrastructure, the British government had a role to play in helping millions flee from Ireland during the famine. The alternative options of workhouses or public works had been organised and facilitated in such a poor manner, that anyone who wished to emigrate from Ireland should be aided in doing so, to ensure they had a safe and healthy journey. Furthermore, even when possibility of assisted emigration was brought up in the government, the administration chose instead to cut expenditure on aid (Coogan 201). This resulted in deaths by starvation becoming much more common during the early months of 1947.
Christine Kinealy supports Coogan on this matter by claiming that the government’s refusal to intervene by regulating emigration led to the potato blight being ‘transformed into one of the most lethal famines in modern history’ (220). Kinealy is a highly respected English-born Irish historian whose extensive knowledge of the Great Famine is demonstrated by the fact she was invited to speak during Tony Blair’s well-known apology for the British government’s actions during the Famine. She argues ‘The mortality and emigration statistics are the simplest yet most effective benchmark of the failure of these policies’ (These policies being non-interventionism) (22). The statistics include 33 emigrants who had died due to cholera in just the space of 49 days on a coffin ship sailing to New York. On another trip, form Sligo to Liverpool, 72 of the passengers died due to suffocation, after being moved below deck and receiving no food or water (Kinealy The Great Irish Famine 59). Had the government regulated these vessels to avoid disease and severe lack of space, tragedies such as these could have been avoided, thousands of resulting deaths avoided too. (Kelly 289).
Nevertheless, Charles Trevelyan saw the issue of emigration in a very different manner. He claimed if persons who wished to emigrate did not have the strength or skills to organise emigration on their own they would be unfit for work in a foreign country. Therefore, if the government were to help these people, they may be wasting their money by bringing people from one country where they have no money and therefore no food, to another country where nothing. Whereas, those who wished to emigrate and could to organise it themselves, would need no government assistance. The government would be wasting its time and money helping these people, if the free market could help these people instead (Trevelyan 132-133). Through this theory, the Whig administration believed its policy of inaction would not exacerbate the effects of the famine.
However, there were thousands more in Ireland who wished to emigrate but never had the opportunity to, due to the high emigration fees. By 1847, the cost to travel across to the Americas was £5 (Kinealy The Great Irish Famine 99). The vast majority of households could obviously not afford this, so it was up to their landlords to provide them with the money. Many landlords did, as this was easier than evicting their tenants, however there were also many who did not (Kelly 256). Diaries from the time show that some farmers had to sell their entire plot of land, just to pay the fare to cross the Atlantic (Clarke 35). If the government had chosen to assist with emigration, many more people could have escaped the hunger and disease plaguing Ireland, and hundreds of thousands of lives would have been saved.
After the first period of mass emigration in 1847, the British government defended its inaction by claiming that that no one could have foreseen what was to come and that they did not have the administrative machinery to regulate or even prohibit the emigration (Edwards 347). Robert Edwards states that the first part of the British government’s defence is simply untrue, as the government must have been aware that mass emigration was very likely to occur during the catastrophe of the Famine. Edwards points out that although the government didn’t have the statistical information and administrative techniques to avoid this mass emigration, they could have increased the number of emigration officers and used government transport as hospital hulks at large ports (348). While these are good points too, the government could have done even more; such use their own ships for emigration. On these ships all factors would remain regulated and the process of emigration would be much more successful. The points which Edwards makes are completely valid, however his revisionist bias is somewhat evident here, as he fails to acknowledge that the Whig administration could have done much more if it had not been so obsessed with the concept of laissez-faire. Therefore, when returning to Coogan’s original claim, one would conclude that a system of assisted emigration organised by the British government would indeed have limited the devastating effects of starvation and disease to a significant extent.
Conclusion
Taking all factors into account, this essay has demonstrated that the British Whig government’s economic policies were indeed culpable for the effects of the Potato Famine on the Irish population from 1846 to 1852 to a great extent. Overall Coogan’s view that the administration was culpable to a very large degree seems to be quite accurate considering the findings of this essay. The Whig administration’s policy of inaction, market based solutions and ideological fixation on laissez-faire both directly and indirectly led to a million Irishmen starving to death. Although food imports did outnumber exports during the famine, the government’s refusal to prevent exports during the 1846/47 winter resulted in the deaths of thousands upon thousands of people. The wages paid at the public work schemes relative to the rising prices of food limited the success of this program greatly, which left many families without food. The soup kitchens were the only relief system policy which amounted to any significant success, nevertheless the policy of workhouses as relief was extremely ineffective as they were disease-filled, short of food supplies and overcrowded. Lastly, the Whig’s inactive policy on emigration led to thousands dying on board of unregulated vessels, and thousands more simply stranded in Ireland. If the government had chosen to intervene and supply relief aid to Ireland, it is possible that the British public would have been furious that their tax money was being spent in a foreign country. This would limit the amount of relief supplied by government, due to the British people rather than government policy, however we cannot know if this would be the case on hindsight. In conclusion, it is clear that the Whig government policy was largely responsible for the effects of the famine and therefore, John Mitchell was quiet possibly correct when he said, ‘The Almighty, indeed, sent the potato blight, but the English created the Famine”.