365 days in a year, 24 hours in one day, and 60 seconds in every minute. Time is constantly ticking away. Or is it? Humans have created time in measurable forms such as the clock and the calendar. We treat each day as a new day like time has restarted, and then we race to accomplish as much as we can before “time” tells us that we have to stop and go to bed and wait until the next day to do it all over again. But, at the end of a 24-hour period time does not restart. Time continues to keep moving forward and time will never stop regardless of how any life form chooses to measure time. But, if time does not restart then it follows that time may have no end. If time has no end, then time may not have a beginning. If time does not have a beginning or an end, then how does time exist? In the paper, I argue that time does not necessarily have a beginning and time does not exist due to the contradiction in the A- series of events.
First, I will begin by describing two different ways people tend to conceive of time. I will follow this by presenting Swinburne’s argument that time has no beginning. After, presenting Swinburne’s argument I will go over the possible problem with Swinburne’s account. Then, I will present an argument for the notion that time does have a beginning, but only to show that it is very difficult to argue for the existence of a first event. After this, I will present the A- series of events and identify McTaggart’s “master argument” for the claim that time does not exist. Finally, I will present my argument for the claim that time does not have a beginning. After the delivery of my argument, I will account for different perspectives of ways that one may object to my argument and then will reply to these objections.
II. Swinburne’s Argument
To measure time is to measure the “passage” of time according to some unit of measurement. Passage can be accounted for in two ways. First, the dimensioned view which is that time is something that we move through, analogous to how we move through space. Second, the stream view which is that time is something that moves through us. It enables us to change our positions, parts, and other properties. For example, we are like rocks in streams, and time just washes over us. Both of these views have us wondering the same questions: does time have a beginning? And does time have an end? Most people would answer yes, because many think that there was a first “initial moment of change.” Richard Swinburne thinks that time has no beginning. He believes that every moment is preceded by some other moment. A basic assumption in his argument is that to say that something, S, was the case is to say that there is an earlier time at which S is the case. Swinburne’s argument is as follows:
1. The sentence “There were swans or there were no swans” is a logical truth and so is true with respect to (or “at”) every single time.
2. Thus, at every time, either there were swans or there were no swans.
3. To say that there were swans, is to say that there is a past time at which there are swans.
4. To say that there were no swans is to say that there is a past time at which there are no swans.
5. Thus, either way, for every moment in time, there must be an earlier time at which either there are swans or there are no swans.
6. Therefore: For every moment in time, there is an earlier moment.
In Swinburne’s argument we can understand the statement “there were no swans” in two ways. ‘P’ will stand for there is a past time, ‘~’ will stand for it is not the case that, and ‘S’ will stand for there are swans. So,
1. P~S… “there is a past time at which there are no swans” (premise 4) and;
2. ~PS… “it is not the case that there is a past time at which there are swans.”
Problems with Swinburne’s argument include that in premise 1 of Swinburne’s argument, he makes a claim about logical truth: PS v ~PS is a logical truth; but PS v P~S is not. In order for premise 1 to be true, then premise 4 has to be made false. In premise 4 Swinburne says that ‘there were swans’ which is to be understood as P~S. So, Swinburne shifts the meaning in premise 1 to premise 4 from ~PS to P~S. If the inference from if ~PS then P~S were valid, this would not cause a problem for Swinburne, but if ~PS then P~S is not valid.
III. The Cosmology Argument
The contemporary cosmological theory tells us that the first event known is the big bang. The argument is as follows:
1. The universe is expanding and will continue to expand.
2. Thus, the further into the future you go, the universe will get less and less dense.
3. Thus, the further into the past you go, the universe will get more and more dense.
4. Thus, if time has no beginning (is infinitely old), then there is some past state of the universe where it has infinite density.
5. It is reasonable to think that a state of infinite density is impossible.
6. Thus, it is reasonable to think that time does indeed have a beginning.
The problem with the cosmology argument is that the inference in premise 3 is invalid. This is known as the “changing laws” problem. The laws of the universe possibly were different a long time ago. But, maybe there was a point in the past in which density reaches a finite maximum. So, maybe there was an infinite series of big- bangs before this last one. Premise 5 is also false. For example, black holes are states of infinite density so infinite density is not impossible.
This brings me to Newton- Smith’s conclusion, that it is difficult to argue for the existence of a first- event. So, it is reasonable to assume that every event must be caused by a preceding event. Thus, there seems to be no reason to think that there must be a first event. Therefore, there is no reason to think that time has a beginning.
IV. A- Series of Events and McTaggart’s “Master Argument”
The A- series of events consists of three possible ways of “being in time.” These three positions are: being past, being present, or being future. Each position can be seen as a property containing events; like a box with events inside. The past and future boxes always contain more events. Events in the A- series can change in their temporal position, meaning that the boxes are able to switch what is inside. Events usually change from being future, to being present, to being past.
In order to show that time does not exist, McTaggart proposes to show both that the A- series is essential to our notion of time, and that the A- series leads to contradictions. His “master argument” is as follows:
1. If there is time, then there is an A- series of events.
2. There is no A- series of events.
3. Therefore, there is no time.
This argument leads to McTaggart’s “Inconsistent A- series” Argument which is used to show that premise 2 of his “master argument” is true by proving that the A- series entails a contradiction. This argument is as follows:
1. If there is an A-series, then every event e in that series is either P (past), N (now), or F (future), but not more than one of these.
2. If e is P, it was once N and was once F
3. If e is N, it was once F and will be P
4. If e is F, it will be N and will be P
5. ‘is’, ‘was once’, and ‘will be’ are simply devices to attribute a predicate/property to something.
6. Thus, if e is attributed either P, N or F, then all three P, N, and F are also truly predicated of e.
7. Thus, if e has P, N, or F, then it has all three
8. But that’s impossible, given 1 above.
9. Thus, there is no A-series.
McTaggart’s inconsistency argument has been followed by many objections and criticisms. Many have said that premise 5 is false because e, whenever it exists, only instantiates N, so there is no contradiction within the A- series. The McTaggartian response to this objection is that if there is an A- series, then every event must be both real and unreal since every real event will also be unreal as soon as it is past, which is also a contradiction. But, if there were an “unreal” property, then there would have to be a real thing to instantiate it since instantiation entails that there is something doing the instantiating. So, there is no contradiction because if e is unreal, what we are saying is that e is not doing any instantiating at all.
V. My Argument
After presenting both McTaggart’s “master argument” and Swinburn’s argument on the beginning of time, I hope that my argument will further advance McTaggart’s conclusion that there is no time and Swinburn’s conclusion that time has no beginning. My argument begins with a principle:
The Principle of Necessary Origin: for any time, t, if t is the first moment in time, then it is necessarily the first moment in time.
The argument is as follows:
1. Suppose, for purposes of argument, that time has a beginning: t-0.
2. t-0 contains an event: the first event, call it, e.
3. Regardless of what event e is, it is possible that e is the second event.
4. If it is possible that e is the second event, then it is possible that there is a time before t-0.
5. Thus, if our initial supposition is right, and there is a beginning, then it remains possible that there is a time before that beginning.
6. If it is possible that there is a time before t-0, then there is a time before t-0. [from the principle mentioned above]
7. Thus, if there is a beginning of time, then it is not the beginning.
8. Therefore, there is no beginning to time.
9. If there is time, then there is an A- series of events.
10. Every event is both past, present, and future.
11. If every event is both past, present, and future then this is a contradiction.
12. Thus, there is no A- series.
13. If there is no A- series, then there is no time.
14. Thus, time does not have a beginning and time does not exist due to the contradiction in the A- series of events.
Someone may reject premise 10 of my argument. One may say that some events may be such that they will be past, are present, and were future. But, the events can never be such that they are present, are past, and are future. To which I would respond that if one says that something was present then there is some point in the past at which it was present. Any two of the past, the present, and the future can be combined in this way, so any event can have any property of past, present, or future. Meaning that the past can be in the past, the present in the past, and the future in the past and so forth. This is where the contradiction lies. So, the A- series entails a contradiction.
Someone may also reject the principle of necessary origin in my argument. They may reject the principle of necessary origin on the grounds that we do not actually know what time is. One may believe that time is only accounted for based on an individual’s perception and how time is measured with clocks and calendars. So, if the universe did not exist, would time still exist? If time existed without the existence of the universe then it is possible that there is infinite time. But, I would respond with the A- series contradiction. If there was infinite time then there would be events in time. Events in time would have one of the properties of being past, being present, and being future. If any event has a property of being past, being present, or being future then it also has the others. No event can have more than one property of being past, being present, or being future. Thus, no event has any of the following properties of being past, being present, or being future.
V. Conclusion
Swinburne and many others argued for the fact that time has no beginning. Some argued that Swinburne’s argument shifts meaning from premise to premise which causes Swinburne’s argument to be invalid. But, I believe that Swinburne is correct that there is no beginning of time. I then showed the possible argument for the notion that time has a beginning through the cosmology argument. To which, brought me to Newton- Smith’s conclusion, that it is difficult to argue for the existence of a first- event. There is reason to argue for a first event, but it is more reasonable to argue for the fact that there is always a moment in time that could of preceded that “first event.” I then presented the A- series of events to dive into McTaggart’s “master argument” for the claim that time does not exist. This lead to McTaggart’s “Inconsistent A- series” argument to show that the A- series entails a contradiction.
Finally, I provided my argument for the claim that time does not necessarily have a beginning and time does not exist due to the contradiction in the A- series of events. My argument was followed up with possible objections to my argument. But, these objections failed because of the A- series contradiction, the A- series is not valid so without the A- series there is no time and if there is no time then there is not a beginning to time because if something does not exist then there cannot be a beginning.