To a lesser extent the resistance to apartheid was very slow to develop at the level of the Western government during the 1950s and 1960s .South Africa rather considered itself, and they were considered by others, to be important to the Western world, who’s valued both for its tactical position with regards to trade routes around the Cape and as a source of extremely useful and necessary minerals such as shown in (Appendix 1- useful and necessary minerals). In a time of struggle for independence throughout Africa, and at the peak of the Cold War, South Africa’s white government was looked steadily at by many in the West as a defensive wall against communism in the country.
The thoughtfulness in most cases took importance over any moral questions concerning apartheid throughout the 1950’s and regardless of concerns over the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre. Nelson Mandela noted that ‘in the 1950s and 1960s, when we went to Western governments seeking contributions to the ANC (African National Congress), we were turned down flat’ (Mandela 1994: 603).
The most important moves against South Africa in this time came from international bodies like the Commonwealth and the UN (United Nations). The Commonwealth became more aggressive towards South Africa as newly independent countries started joining the organisation. ‘Sharpeville catalysed the issue of South Africa’s membership’ (Grundy 1991: 80-81). When the white people of South Africa voted in the 1960s for the country to become a republic, the government wanted more membership of the Commonwealth, but it met with considerable resistance.
Resistance to apartheid was being voiced by many in the United States in this period of time, for South Africa to be expelled from the UN. For the need of Security Council approval for actions like that, because the veto held by the Western powers were not about to happen. These calls weren’t formally paid attention to.
A very successful campaign was carried out against South Africa, however, in the other UN journals. In the 1950s, critical reports of apartheid were published by UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation). In 1963 South Africa’s withdrawal was forced by the Food and Agriculture Organisation. So did the International Labour Organisation and the World Health Organisation in 1964 and others later followed. In 1965 the UN Trust Fund for South Africa was established, with most of its funds being utilized for human welfare assistance to liberation movements, legal defence, education programs, development projects, and support for the apartheid victims (Shepard 1977:128).
An important UN action against apartheid in the 1960s was its ‘voluntary’ ban against the selling of military weapons to South Africa, which was finally adopted in full agreement by the Security Council. By mid 1970s, Shepard (1977:87), stated that it was very clear that it had not stopped the flow of arms from the west and also it didn’t change the relationship in any way.
Maybe most new ideas were the efforts made to isolate South Africa culturally and socially. That was encouraged by civil society activists and then formed into the policies of sympathetic governments. Academic boycotts were formed in 1965 by a university group of British staff. The boycotts isolated scholars by restricting their access to opportunities to publish internationally and to engage with counterparts abroad and their ability to research. It was more of an irritation than a true hindrance because it was easily circumvented. It was not a lever to encourage the government. It was also a public debate with many troubled by its weakening academic freedom and disagreeing that material commodities should be treated differently to knowledge.
These cultural sanctions during the 1980s were publicly approved by a UN resolution saying that foreign artists shouldn’t work with South Africa. The most influential initiative was the sports boycott. It began with the expulsion by FIFA in 1961 from international football. Segregation of sporting activity in South Africa was one of the significant features of apartheid (Appendix 2- racial segregation of sports). The arena of international sport was early proving ground for the international resistance to apartheid. It began in the year 1956 with the expulsion of the white South Africans from the International Table Tennis Federation.
South Africa was also excluded from the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 before being humiliatingly and decisively expelled from the Olympic Games after 50 countries threatened to boycott the games if South Africa was included in it. The sports boycotting was the most obvious sign to the public that the whole world did not approve of the policies in South Africa. Because of the countries racial policies and expulsion in 1972 from the International Olympic Movement, there was a snowballing effect against South Africa by the sporting bodies of the world. By the end of the 1980s, South Africa was excluded from about 90 percent of the world’s international sporting activities.
The year 1970 was a catastrophic year for white African sport, which was a year when huge demonstrations staged in Britain in the protest against the Springbok rugby tour, in spite of the unchanging British government opposition to the sports boycott campaign. One of the effects of this and similar international demonstrations was the introduction made by Pretoria in 1971 for a new multinational policy. This stated that all the different racial groups in South Africa will be allowed to compete against one another but as four different nations in the country, but only in international events.
The moves that were made did nothing to South Africa’s sporting isolation, despite all the huge claims, the sport of South Africa stayed completely influential by apartheid. The isolation in the sports of South Africa had, without a doubt, made a huge evident psychological impact on the white South Africans, because South Africans are very sport conscious and the severity of their sporting isolations had a bigger impact on them than any other issue.
The truly transactional character of the campaign of sports clearly showed to every South African that his government’s policies weren’t respected internationally. The success of the boycotting of sports, however, is less clear. A comparison of this boycott was made by a campaign of entertainment and artistic boycotts, which was also aimed at isolating the whites of South Africa. Some people argued that the boycotts could possibly be counterproductive, by preventing white South Africans of exposure to the Western ideas and thinking’s, they are possibly being encouraged to stay in their present mental state.
Further questions came after Paul Simons album ‘Graceland’ was released and his follow after tour in mid 1980s, which both featured black South African musicians, to the complete surprise of not really a few supporters of the struggle and to the puzzled outrage of Simon himself. Simon received severe criticism from the ANC, the UN and many other key forces in apartheid for breaking the cultural boycott, in spite of the anti-apartheid theme of Simons ‘Graceland’ tour (Phelan 1987:198)
Cultural and sports boycotts were clear notable traits of international anti-apartheid activities. These activities were led as much, or even more from the bottom as it was from the top. While the Western governments, mainly those of the United States and Britain, were unwilling to take quick steps against Pretoria for strategic and economic reasons and the domestic pressure often forced them to act. The 1980s saw the implementation of considerable economic pressure against South Africa for the first time (Appendix 3 ‘examples of economic pressure in the 1980s).
Even though it always had a small ineffectual anti-apartheid movement compared to that in Britain, U.S.A was the driving force in the 1980s sanction movements. A fast growing temporary alliance of the black human rights group, universities and ant-apartheid organisations, trade unions demanded comprehensive sanctions and churches, including disinvestment and they themselves began to enforce divestment. In addition to ty and isolate South Africa, the campaigners sought to hurt its economy.
This temporary alliance was supported by the US media, reporting on South Africa in detail. The American anti-apartheid opinion slowed down from the civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s with evidence of early anti-apartheid activity in 1960 and stabilising in 1963 and then peaking in 1978 and again in between the years 1984 and 1986. Even though the peaks agree to crisis periods in South Africa, the great speed rise in the anti- apartheid activities between the years 1984 and 1986 were not a reaction to the events in South Africa.
The movement had grown with the increase of more than 20 years of the organising experience and was able to form part of a long term plan to deploy resources and press its demands the new ordering of the U.S policy, interest towards South Africa at the time. These were matched up by developments in the U.S. Congress in late 1970s. A small number of white and African liberal legislators elected in late 1960s and 1970s, it started to reach senior positions in Congress.
They were better positioned to raise issues and to influence their colleagues as the rose the anti-apartheid legislation first moved to the government agenda consequently, following the Soweto Massacre (Appendix 4 ‘ Soweto Massacre) in the year 1976 and Steve Biko’s murder in 1977, these bills never moved out of committee until 1983.
The wide international ranging sanctions on South African gold, although it’s very difficult to enforce gold because of its ability to be hammered into shape and for now it’s anonymous nature and might have proven effective. 38.4 percent of gold accounted for all South Africa’s export earnings in the year 1988. 10 percent all government earnings are accounted for, for almost one-eighth of GDP.
The financial crisis was far more painful due to the deteriorating climate. From a series of urban strikes, uprisings and consumer boycotts combined with the ANCs idea of economic warfare, attacks on government targets, industrial sabotage to bring South Africa to a standstill. By revoking some of the apartheid laws and by imposing national state pf emergency in 1985 that’s how the government responded.
Against this way of increasing un-governability, many people expected the government to announce the significant reforms to talk about the escalating tension. But Botha answered back by telling the world that his government will not be adaptable to any pressure whether it from the inside or the outside and is prepared to go about it alone if necessary.
A short while after that, the Chase Manhattan Bank said it would not recommence South Africa’s short term loans, which started a crisis with its current assets as the other lenders similarity withdrew credit. South Africa was very dependent on foreign lenders to finance their external debt and these doings turned a 50 percent drop in the currency’s value and this created severe capital scarcity.
The financial crisis was brought on by the decisions that the private lenders made, that judged that South Africa’s pause in the economy, political turmoil and market uncertainty combined to make it unattractive for investment. Their initiative was to rationalize their own financial risk rather than to start the changes to apartheid and the decisions made to back out of the preceded enforcement of the governments sanction policy. Yet it was the most damaging economic act of the external actors.