On 11 November 2015, the European Commission (the E.U’s executive arm) published an ‘Interpretative Notice’ which aims at ensuring the uniform application of existing E.U law to the indication of origin of Israeli settlement products. In other words, products from the territories taken by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War (i.e. Gaza Strip, the West Bank including East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights) can no longer be sold in the 28 E.U members states as having come from Israel. The document has made clear that the Union ‘will not recognise any changes to pre-1967 borders, other than those agreed by the parties to the Middle East Peace Process’. The interpretive notice also states that it is not a new law, rather it reflects the commission's understanding of relevant EU legislation. It is important noting that this decision is a result of three years of administrative work and discussion at the European Union institutions.
Predictably, Israeli officials had received this decision unfavourably which eventually triggered into fierce anger, indignation and harsh criticism towards this situation. Indeed, Israel has seen this E.U move as a stain to its image, a threat to its legitimacy and an aggravating factor which bring forth the fear of international isolation. Thereby, as a response to this situation, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu government officials have elaborated and established a message framework, processes and procedures in an attempt to mitigate this political crisis event.
For example, the messages intentionally crafted to domestic and foreign audiences, bring on the rush of retaliatory reactions from Israeli officials across the political sphere describing the move as such as anti-Semitic, a double standard, unfair, a boycotting, a barrier to the advance of the Palestinian peace process. ‘It will certainly not advance truth and justice. It's wrong. Europe should be ashamed of itself’, declared Netanyahu at the same day that the E.U decision was published. Besides the aimed messages, the Israeli Foreign Ministry made sure to punish the institution by cutting diplomatic relations and by cancelling a low-level meeting, which had been intended to move ahead on aid to the Palestinians.
Problems regarding Israel’s reputation are not new. In a historical overview, since its creation in 1948, Israel has implemented efforts to reverse any negative coverage cause mainly by running events, in this case the aim is to disseminate specific messages reflecting the perception a country wishes to promote for itself. This determinant attempt made by a state is public diplomacy (LEONARD, 2002). Considered a new and developing field of study and practice, public diplomacy constitutes an excellent instrument of a state’s soft power (NYE, 2008).
The long-standing tradition with manufacturing of dissatisfaction has established public diplomacy as a key concept and an instrument in Israel’s foreign relations. Its character is so unique that Israel has its own interpretation of the larger filed of public diplomacy: hasbara. It is worth noticing that public diplomacy or hasbara has been long studied in relation to war and conflicts, albeit, its role during crises has heretofore largely been neglected (Brown 2002; Mor 2006, 2007; Cortell, Eisinger, & Althaus 2009). So, this study is a contribution on this subject.
As research on states in crisis is rare, so is research on the link between crisis communication and public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is a new and emerging field of research that has undergone different stages of appreciation in research as in professional practice depending on real world events, i.e. the cold war, post’cold war era, and 9/11. (AUER & SRUGIES, 2013).
In this article, I explore the Israeli public diplomacy through crisis communication as rhetoric. For that, I undertake Israeli discourse and practice towards the ‘2015 EU decision to label settlement goods’ as evidenced through statements made by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and key officials involved in the management of the crisis. With this in mind, I engage to answer the following question: How can Israeli public diplomacy, applying crisis communication as rhetoric, considered in this article, contribute to crisis mitigation?
2. Soft Power, Public Diplomacy and Nation’s Image
Soft power brings a new visibility on a way a warfare is conduced on bringing about a realisation that the fight against military organisations and terrorist networks extends well beyond military operations (Lennon, 2003). Nye (2004) argues that ‘meeting the challenges posed by transnational military organisations . . . requires cooperation of other countries’and cooperation is strengthened by soft power’. As opposed to ‘hard power’ which involves military or economic coercion to implement policies, ‘soft power’ lies in the ability to attract and persuade (NYE, 2004).
Countries are increasingly recognising the significance of soft power. For example, the authors of the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy wrote: ‘We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism.’ And Mark Leonard (2002), the head of the British Foreign Policy Centre, argued that ‘it took the tragedy of September 11th for the ‘battle for hearts and minds’ to rise once again to the top of the international political agenda. However, the subject matter is not that soft power is sufficient to defeat terror, but rather that a combination between hard power and soft power ‘ which is called ‘smart power” is needed. (NYE, 2004).
Thus, public diplomacy is one of the major ways to implement soft power which is defined as ‘efforts by the government of one nation to influence public or elite opinion in a second nation for the purpose of turning the foreign policy of the target nation to advantage’ (LEONARD, 2002; GILBOA, 2006). Yet, public diplomacy is well accepted by scholars and currently practitioners of diplomacy and it is becoming even more widely known than in the past. Israel is an interesting example regard to public diplomacy due to the fact that its criticism is constantly discussed in the Israeli media (KOTLER, 2008) and in academia (GILBOA, 2006). Most critics blame Israeli public diplomacy for being unorganised, uncoordinated, retroactive rather than proactive.
Israel maintained a positive image and reputation abroad from 1948 to 1967 and during the few periods of constructive negotiations in the Arab’ Israeli conflict, including the 1977’1979 Israeli’Egyptian peace process and the 1993’1994 Oslo negotiations. During the 1991 Gulf War, Israel also garnered sympathy in the international community because it refrained from retaliating against Iraqi missile attacks on its major cities. (GILBOA, 2008). However, its image abroad has declined tremendously since the outbreak the second intifada or the Palestinian’Israeli war (PIW) in September 2000.
Israel’s status-quo has being constantly challenged by the international arena. The UN, and most other international organisations, has systematically discriminated against Israel and disproportionately attacked its policies. NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, frequently criticise Israel while ignoring serious human rights violations on the part of Arabs and Palestinians (INBAR, 2013). Boycotts and divestment campaigns such as The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement, Enemies, opponents and critics portray Israel as the world’s worst violator of human rights, UN resolutions and international law.
According to a BBC World Service poll conducted between 2013 and 2014 Israel is one of the countries with mainly negative influence in the world.