Ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and Africa in general arise as result of scarcity of political resources, multi-culturalism, religion, militarisation of ethnicity among others. These conflicts cannot be ignored. It is therefore patently clear that realistic measures to solve these problems are needed.
2.2.1 Causes of Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria
All across Nigeria there is an ever-lengthening thread of ethnic violence. These are not isolated events but are interconnected. Powerful social and economic factors gave rise to them.
2.2.1.1 Poverty
One such factor, the most powerful, is the ever-increasing level of poverty typified in joblessness, deteriorating infrastructures, to list just a few. All these clashes are due to the fundamental crisis of underdevelopment; there is widespread poverty and this gives rise to a scramble for limited resources. Most of these communities are no better than slums. Industries are shutting down with the attendant consequences of job losses; most families find it difficult to feed themselves.
There are no potable water, good roads, proper medical facilities, social infrastructures, and no good schools. Environments such as these generate fear, distrust, hatred, frustrations, anger, to mention but a few. Under such circumstances, it is easy to believe that if the other ethnic groups go away, there will be enough.
According to the multiple indicator cluster survey published by the federal office of statistics in 1996, only one in every ten Nigerian can be described as non-poor. The other 90 per cent are described as either "core poor" or "moderately poor". Taken in context, what one sees is the harsh reality of a nation where less than 11 million people can be described as "living people", while the remaining 99 million people are best described as the "living dead".
2.2.1.2 Manipulations
These factors provide classic hot beds for ethnic clashes. Recognizing this, the ruling class consciously exploits the poison of ethnicism as a means of keeping the working class permanently divided and diverting their attention away from the real problems confronting them – the crisis of Nigerian capitalism. Nor is this policy of "divide and rule" an exclusive phenomenon. It is the resort of the ruling class internationally. It is a conscious policy of the ruling class that allows for their continuing oppression and exploitation of the poor working masses, their continuing hold onto power.
The manipulation of ethnic differences reflects the fear of the ruling class of the potentials of the Nigerian working class and its capacity for unity – a unity that cuts across ethnic lines. The conscious manipulation of ethnic consciousness under terrible social conditions gives rise to periodic explosions of ethnic clashes. This is also a reflection of the inability of the ruling class to foster genuine unity among the masses. It confirms the fact that capitalism and ethnic violence are interlinked; you cannot have the former without the latter.
2.3 Niger Delta
Nigeria is a multi-ethnic society, consisting of different ethnic nationalities joined together by the Lord Luggard amalgamation of 1914. Although these groups co-exist, their ethnic and cultural values are different. These cultural differences are sometimes accentuated resulting in various kinds of communal clashes such as the Ijaw-Itsekiri, Urhobo, Benue-Cross River, Ife-Modakeke crises, to mention a few.
During the years of military dictatorship, communal clashes and ethnic conflicts were rather minimal because they were suppressed by military might. However, in the current democratic dispensation, every citizen tends to have more room and opportunity to self-expression, but at times, this right is often misunderstood for vulgarism. The resultant effect is conflicts amongst the ethnic groups, tribes, kindred and even clans.
Another crisis of big magnitude in the entity called Nigeria is the conflict between ethnic groups in Niger Delta area and the Multinational oil companies. These areas have not known peace since the past eight years. Examples of such conflicts, include Obobutu vs Elf (October 1989), Umuechem vs Shell (October 1990), Uzere vs Shell (July 1992), and Ogoni vs Shell (1990 till date).
The latest brewing conflict include the one from the issue of “resource controlâ€, which if not properly handled by the Federal Government as quickly as possible, may hasten tension that may lead to more wanton destruction of lives and properties. This conflict, if allowed may mar the corporate existence of Nigeria (Ojo & Alao, 2001:3).
The Niger Delta, the oil-rich region in the south of Nigeria, has faced an increase in violence in recent years. The region’s wealth in natural resources stands in contrast to its deprivation and underdevelopment. The Nigerian economy is heavily dependent on the oil sector, which accounts for approximately 95 percent of total export earnings and 80 percent of federal government revenue. All of Nigeria’s onshore oil production takes place in the nine states of Niger Delta. Unrest in the region has led to significant losses in onshore production, particularly since late 2005. Addressing the crisis in the Delta region therefore has important implications for the rest of Nigeria both in economic and security terms.
The developmental challenges facing Niger Delta are closely intertwined with the current patterns of violent conflict and instability in the region. These challenges are multi-dimensional; and tackling them will require a thorough understanding of the drivers and dynamics of conflict escalation and de-escalation, as well as the links between conflict and poverty.
The percentage of people living in poverty in Niger Delta is lower than the national average, according to figures for (NBS 2004:16). However, Niger Delta performs poorly in comparison with the rest of the country on social indicators such as education, health and the quality of the natural environment. For example, the region has among the highest levels of infant mortality in Nigeria; some estimates place the level of youth unemployment at 40 percent in Niger Delta. Rates of unemployment and underemployment in Niger Delta states with large oil revenues are especially high, a condition that has contributed to youth restiveness.
Within the oil-rich Niger Delta, a multitude of ethnic groups, such as the Ijaw and Ogoni, have competed for control of the region’s natural resource since the early 1990s. This competition has now further subdivided ethnic minorities that were all exploited at one point or another in the oil production business. As the area has become much more militarized and hostile, the Nigerian people have become less coerced and united in an already-fragile nation.
In order to try to bring about the terminus of the violence in the Delta and to develop the area, in June 2009, the Nigerian government decided to take an offensive approach against MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta) to attempt to return peace to the diverse region, but had to fall back onto amnesty of the militants of the region; hence, much skepticism has fermented as to whether or not the ethnic conflicts of the Nigerian people will cease in under the Yar’Adua regime.
Nonetheless, why have ethnic interests overridden national interests or wittingly undermined national patriotism? According to Ikporukpo (1998:15), the causes of the Ogoni-Andoni and the Okrika-Ogoni inter-communal conflicts are all related to the role played by resource control agitations on ethnic identities from colonial times to oil exploitation activities in the area. Ikporukpo asserts that: The policies and programs of government and oil companies address mainly the conflict between petroleum exploitation and livelihood, the collapse of rural –urban leakages and the land disputes/ communities crisis. Ikporukpo (1998: 48).
However, the situation in Niger Delta is better explained by Ololajulo (2006:3) who pointed out that resource control has become a permanent feature of the instability in the region leading to hostilities and affecting the economic well-being of the people.
One important element of conflicts in the area is the attachment to development. Development in this regard means the people’s ability to maintain their cultural values and sustain their traditional economic resources. Development is expected to improve and advance the condition and standard of living of the people. But development in Niger Delta is elusive, according to Ibeanu (1997:10), the persistence of violence distorts and destroys resource flows, thereby threatening development and the people’s livelihood.
Therefore, efforts are directed toward agitation to control resources like crude oil – the ‘black gold’ – that is being exploited for external interests. Weighed against the background of the immense resources the nation generates from the area, Niger Delta region could be said to be relatively underdeveloped especially when compared to places like Lagos, Abuja, Kano and Kaduna, which without oil are yet developed with oil money.
Apart from references to conflict and agitation to control resources as obstacles to development in Niger Delta, there are also identity agitations by the various ethnic groups who want to break off from the Nigerian federation. As Bassey (2003:10) observed, the unique combination of these features, like ethnic identity agitation, constitute the spectrum of conflicts in Niger Delta. The people in Niger Delta believe that they are underdeveloped economically and socially despite the enormous revenue made from oil in their areas.
2.3.1 Ethnic Conflict in Niger Delta
Ethnic conflict is viewed as conflict, disagreement, misunderstanding whether violent or otherwise between different ethnic groups, Galtung (1995:6) believes that ethnic conflict arises as a result of common group consciousness for survival or request to attain certain goals that are considered to be of great value and which are perceived as being blocked. This encourages discrimination, based on ‘We’ and ‘Them’. According to Usman (1987:2) the prevalence of ethno-communal conflicts could be traced to mistrust, suspicion, selfishness, intolerance and ignorance between groups. While Sears (2008:34) in his own view, states that ethno communal conflict is further made complex when the State is perceived to be serving the particular interests of the most powerful or influential group while claiming to represent the interests of all. Moreover, Lloyd contends that ethnic loyalty stands at the base of ethnic group. He describes ethnic loyalty as a feeling of attachment to one’s ethic group. The loyalty carries with it the willingness to support and act positively or otherwise, on behalf of the ethnic group and having a rejective attitude towards those regarded as ‘outsider’. Irobi (2005:8)
Galtung (1987:5) opines that, more often than not, ethnic and other sectarian conflicts are highly complicated and much more difficult to resolve than even inter- state wars. The reason is anchored on the fact that the affected people live in the same country or community, experience the tremendous loss of lives of their loved ones and property, and gross human rights violations which are traceable to known individuals that they still see constantly. This, undoubtedly, may lead to nursing of deep hatred towards the perpetrators of such conflicts, especially when justice is not meted to them. Perhaps this is why attack and counter attack always follow the outbreak of an ethnic crisis, -a reason which account for government’s inability to find an enduring solution to some ethnic crisis in Nigeria.
Furthermore, Bouka argues that ethno- communal conflict is either intra or inter ethno-communal in nature. Intra communal conflicts are those conflicts between the people of the same ethnic group. Examples of such in Nigeria are Warri crisis and Akwa Ibom.
2.3.1.1 Warri Crisis 1997
Warri in Delta state is the second most important oil town in Niger Delta (after Port Harcourt). Three ethnic groups claim Warri as their homeland: the Itsekiri, the Urhobo, and the Ijaw. After the creation of Delta State in 1991, the Ijaw and Urhobo expressed dissatisfaction with the way in which they were represented in state and local government structures. In March 1997, violence erupted after the creation of a new local government area, Warri South West. (HRW. 2003:5)
The decision to locate the headquarters of the new LGA in an Itsekiri-speaking area was disputed particularly by Ijaw inhabitants. Hundreds of people died in the clash that continued from March to May 1997 and oil production in the area was severely disrupted. In 1999, the Delta State assembly passed a bill moving the LGA headquarters to an Ijaw-speaking part of Warri. While fighting became less intense, discontent continued and renewed clashes broke out during 2003. (HRW. 2003:5)
2.3.1.2 Akwa Ibom – Cross River Border Clashes
Since the creation of Akwa Ibom State from Cross River State in 1987, there have been several violent communal clashes along the border between the two states. The border problem is mainly due to competition over an area of land believed to have oil reserves. Tensions have been exacerbated by ill-defined state and LGA boundaries which cut through ethnic groups, leaving members of ethnic groups associated with Cross River in land that falls within Akwa Ibom.
The federal government’s 2002 decision to exclude offshore oil revenues from the derivation formula (meaning that the revenues from offshore oil reserves are no longer distributed to the oil-producing states) has increased the stakes and intensity of the conflict over land, as most of Akwa Ibom’s oil reserves are located offshore. (Bassey, 2002:6)
Unfortunately, the problems are identity and resource control agitations. These two problems have severally resulted into inter and intra communal conflicts in the area. It has also led to the establishment of some governmental agencies such as Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB, 1961), Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority (NDBDA, 1976), the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC, 2000), and Niger Delta Ministry in 2009, to provide succor and develop the communities in the area. (Bassey, 2002:6)